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 Problems and Recommendations 
Islam in Tajikistan 
Actors, Discourses, Conflicts 
Interest in Islam has grown enormously in the secular 
states of post-Soviet Central Asia. The revival of Muslim 
values and ideas is particularly conspicuous in Tajiki-
stan, where about 95 percent of the population fol-
lows Sunni Islam. The Tajik regime works hard to con-
tain religious practice and propaganda and deprive 
organised religion of its social base. This affects not 
only illegal Islamist groups, but also institutionalised 
political forces like the Islamic Renaissance Party as 
well as independent religious authorities who suc-
cessfully carry their teachings into society. 
The Tajik regime justifies political containment of 
religion in terms of stability and security imperatives. 
Western politicians and political analysis support this 
perspective, not least on account of the country’s geo-
graphical and cultural proximity to Afghanistan and 
the potential threat from jihadist groups operating 
there. The threat scenario is currently heightened by 
the involvement of Tajiks fighting with the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria. 
The focus on extreme forms of Islam associated 
with such alarmist perceptions, however, obscures the 
complexity of the political conflicts over religion and 
stands in the way of an appropriate assessment not 
only of the religious discourse itself, but also of the 
reasons behind the growing attraction of Islam and its 
potential for creating order. This study explores those 
questions, illuminating the social and political back-
ground to the revival of Islamic discourses, networks 
and practices in Tajikistan since the end of the Soviet 
Union, identifying the central actors, and laying out 
the intellectual and social coordinates of the symbolic 
struggles they are involved in. 
A review of Islam in the Soviet era transpires to be 
enlightening. It reveals the extent to which the topics 
of the present-day religious discourse are pre-formed 
by the debates of the Soviet era and underlines how 
strongly today’s central conflict constellation and the 
three central actors – the post-communist cadres of 
state religion policy, the Hanafite religious elite, and 
its hybrid Islamist challengers – are still rooted in his-
toric figurations. This is particularly striking, given 
the extent to which independence in 1991 shook up 
the religious field. 
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Problems and Recommendations 
The revival of Muslim religiosity was spurred by 
the positive reassessment and reinvention of national 
traditions during the process of post-Soviet nation-
building. Islamic values and everyday practices that 
had survived the Soviet era became integrated as state-
approved cultural heritage into the national narrative 
of the new nation-state. At the same time, the new 
freedom of religion and the opening of the media land-
scape fostered growing demand for religious educa-
tion, and the configuration of actors itself became 
more complex. 
Alongside the traditional Hanafite authorities 
whose religious understanding of the world had been 
formed during the Soviet era (and who represent in-
stitutionalised Islam) a growing number of actors now 
appeared who had studied in other Muslim countries 
after 1991 and thus in a very different context. These 
independent authorities, who are revered above all 
in the younger generation of believers, challenge the 
interpretative monopoly of the traditional authorities, 
as do the new virtual media of widely differing quality 
and provenance that are also used by many young 
people as a source of advice. 
The actors that reject the monopoly position of 
the official religious institutions and their political 
cooptation by the regime include the Islamic Renais-
sance Party (Nahzat). Typologically, Nahzat represents 
a hybrid form uniting conservative mass party and 
Islamist protest movement, whose agenda includes 
both Islamic and secular principles. It seeks the role 
of a constructive opposition party, which is consistent-
ly denied to it by a regime that instead suppresses it 
with all available means. What the government over-
looks in the process is that Nahzat could potentially 
integrate more radical protest potential and thus 
play a role in taming it. This opportunity is wasted by 
hastily criminalising religious dissent and driving it 
underground. 
The state’s desire to assert comprehensive control 
over the field of religion also harms the authority of 
the official Islamic institutions. The mosques, whose 
direct contact with believers grants them decisive 
influence over the shaping of mass religiosity, are of 
central importance here. The state seeks to restrict 
the potential power of religious personnel through a 
system of oversight and surveillance whose contours 
recall Soviet practices. This supplies arguments to all 
those who regard the state’s interventions as evidence 
of the political elite’s hostility to religion and a cynical 
violation of the constitutional principle of separation 
of state and religion. As well as risking its own cred-
ibility here, the state is also undermining the legiti-
macy of the clergy, and thus the local Hanafite Islam 
itself, whose educational tradition cultivates tolerance 
towards culture-specific ritual practice and secular 
lifeworlds, and which ultimately represents the foun-
dation upon which the symbolic order of the Tajik 
polity rests. 
In this context the persistent trend to reduce the 
teaching of religion at state-run educational institu-
tions is clearly counter-productive. For the universalist 
currents of Islam, which reject culture-specific variants 
of Muslim religiosity and whose rigid interpretations 
of the sacred scriptures are liable to polarise society, 
have long since arrived in Tajikistan. These teachings 
cannot be repulsed using the tools of power and con-
trol. Countering them requires intellectual capacity 
and the ability to discriminate. And that requires 
sound religious knowledge. 
There is, however, currently no sign of any change 
of course in state religion policy. That would mean, 
firstly, taking the interest of lay believers seriously, 
rather than ignoring it. Secondly, it would need to 
be accompanied by a recognition of the indispensable 
integrating role of Hanafite Islam. This would, thirdly, 
have to be visibly reflected in increased investment in 
good religious education. Germany and Europe should 
sensitively support such a change of course by encour-
aging the Tajik government to expand its provision 
of religious education. The dialogue on the issue of 
teaching Islam in state schools, initiated in 2011 by 
Germany, France and the European Union, could offer 
a suitable medium. 
 
 
SWP Berlin 
Islam in Tajikistan 
March 2015 
 
 
 
6 
Soviet Religion Policy and Discourse 
Soviet Islam and the Renaissance of Religion 
 
In the pre-Soviet era, Muslim norms and rites were 
an integral social and cultural component of Central 
Asian societies. Colonial conquest by Czarist Russia in 
the nineteenth century initially changed little for the 
Central Asia’s Muslims. While they were integrated 
into the imperial economy of the Russian Empire and 
placed under a new regime, the Czarist administra-
tion did not seek to assimilate them or accomplish any 
radical cultural transformation.1 Under the protection 
of local Czarist governors, the religious elite (‘ulamā), 
which in Central Asia follows the Hanafite school 
(mazhab),2 was in fact able to consolidate its influence. 
Islamic law and the traditional educational institu-
tions (maktab, madrasa) remained largely untouched. 
The reverence of Sufi authorities – religious specialists 
who adhered to gnostic and mystical traditions and 
were often organised in brotherhoods – also survived 
intact.3 
The situation changed radically after the Bolsheviks 
came to power in 1917/18. Soviet religion policy has 
had a lasting impact on Islam in Central Asia, and its 
interventions still define the parameters of Tajik reli-
gious discourse within which the central questions of 
dogma and orthopraxy are negotiated today. Even the 
religious renaissance set in motion by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (1991), and the associated processes 
of dynamisation, pluralisation and autonomisation 
of the religious field, are contained by institutional 
arrangements rooted in Soviet practice. 
1  Adeeb Khalid, “Backwardness and the Quest for Civiliza-
tion: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective”, 
Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (2006): 231–51 (236). 
2  One of the four schools of law in Sunni Islam; became 
established from the eighth century in the Middle East, 
Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and later also in 
Anatolia and the Balkans, 
3  Ashirbek Muminov, “Traditional and Modern Religious-
Theological Schools in Central Asia”, in Political Islam and 
Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, ed. Lena Jonson and Murad 
Esenov (Stockholm, 1999), 101–11; Devin DeWeese, Studies 
on Sufism in Central Asia, Arnham 2012. 
Soviet Religion Policy and Discourse 
The Soviet modernisation project sought a radical 
reordering of state and society. The aim was to lead 
the supposedly “backward” population of the Muslim 
East onto the path of progress and development and, 
in a sweeping cultural revolution, replace their tradi-
tional institutions with ones more suited to realising 
the Soviet vision of a classless society. Overcoming reli-
gious loyalties and replacing them with faith in the 
secular utopia of communism played a central role. 
The attack on the old order began in 1926 with the 
destruction of the Muslim educational structures.4 In 
order to create space for a modern education system 
in the spirit of universal enlightenment and seculari-
sation, Islam was banished from the curriculum of the 
new schools, and traditional schools and medressas 
were closed. Mosques were destroyed or repurposed 
and their assets (waqf) seized. The Soviets clamped 
down particularly hard on the Sufi brotherhoods and 
their spiritual leaders (ishan, shaykh), whose esoteric 
practices they regarded as the pinnacle of backward-
ness. Within a few years, with the aid of massive anti-
religious propaganda, Islam had been effectively elimi-
nated from public life. By 1932 the religious personnel 
had been systematically sidelined, banished to the 
gulags or murdered.5 The second component of the 
cultural revolution was the campaign against the veil-
ing of women’s faces and bodies (faranji and chachvon), 
which the reformers regarded as the most conspicu-
ous symbol of women’s oppression. This campaign, 
which targeted the very heart of the traditional order, 
patriarchal power, provoked vigorous resistance.6 
The repression of the ‘ulamā, the downgrading of 
religious education and the destruction of the struc-
tures that conveyed it were accompanied by political 
and administrative measures that fundamentally 
transformed local societies. Soviet nationality policy 
4  Khalid, “Backwardness” (see note 1), 242f. 
5  Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not Mekka: The Soviet Campaign 
Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941 (Westport, 2001), esp. 
chaps. 5 and 6. 
6  Marianne Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Moder-
nity and Unveiling under Communism (Washington, 2006), 186–
98, 225–28 (esp. chaps. 7 and 8). 
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Soviet Islam and the Renaissance of Religion 
comprised two central components: nativisation 
(korenizacija) of power structures through the creation 
of local cadres,7 and administrative division of the 
region along ethnic and linguistic lines.8 This led, 
between 1924 and 1929, to the founding of the Soviet 
national republics,9 whose existence was legitimised 
retrospectively by the construction of national iden-
tities. This process was associated not only with the 
establishment of national historiography and ethno-
graphy but also a reclassification of Islam, which was 
downgraded to a “relic” of past epochs,10 but accepted 
as an aspect of local tradition and folklore. 
This ambivalent ideological treatment of Islam 
allowed Muslim ritual practices and associated values 
to survive as an everyday religion divorced from pub-
lic discourse, restricted to the sphere of local commu-
nities (family, neighbourhood) and largely deprived 
of its intellectual foundations; collective rituals asso-
ciated with Sufism such as pilgrimages (ziyārat) to holy 
tombs (mazār) also continued. These and other non-
normative practices actually became more significant 
in the sense that religious law (shari’a) lost its status 
as an overall system regulating people’s lives.11 
7  Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics 
in Central Asia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2007), 86–93. 
8  Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-
Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities”, Rus-
sian Review 59, no. 2 (2000): 201–26. Such criteria had played 
no role in the Czarist territorial and administrative reorga-
nisation of Central Asia, where economic, geographical and 
strategic administrative aspects were decisive. While the 
Governor-Generalships of the Steppes and of Turkestan, which 
covered most of modern Kazakhstan and adjoining regions, 
stood under direct Russian administration, political protec-
torates were established (between 1868 and 1873) over three 
quasi-states in the south: the Emirate of Bukhara and the 
Khanates of Khiva and Kokand; see Richard N. Pierce, Russian 
Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, 1960), 
chaps. 2 to 4. 
9  The Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist 
Republics (SSRs) emerged from the Governor-Generalships of 
the Steppes and Turkestan in 1925. The Emirate of Bukhara 
and the Khiva Khanate retained their semi-autonomous status 
until 1924, after which they were integrated into the Uzbek 
SSR, out of which the Tajik SSR was created in 1929. The lat-
ter’s territory included parts of the former Khanate of Kokand 
(in the north) and of the Emirate of Bukhara (in the west and 
south). 
10  Devin DeWeese, “Survival Strategies: Reflections on the 
Notion of Religious ‘Survivals’ in Soviet Ethnographic Studies 
of Muslim Religious Life in Central Asia”, in Exploring the Edge 
of Empire, ed. Florian Mühlfried and Sergey Sokolovskiy (Berlin 
and Zürich, 2011), 35–58. 
11  Khalid, Islam after Communism (see note 7), 98–104; Bakh-
tiyar Babadjanov, “From Colonization to Bolshevization: 
The Second World War led the Soviets to rethink 
their religions policy. In order to secure Muslim sup-
port in the mobilisation against Nazi Germany, the 
persecution of religion was suspended and new free-
doms granted. The founding in 1943 of the Spiritual 
Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia (Sredne-
Aziatskoe Duchovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man or SADUM) 
had a dual purpose.12 The ‘ulamā in Uzbekistan had 
already attempted, unsuccessfully, to establish such 
an institution in the 1920s as a central forum for the 
Muslims of the entire region.13 The creation of such a 
body now appeared possible, and with it the revival 
and survival of religious education in a hostile environ-
ment. For the state in turn, SADUM was useful as an 
organ of centralised control and oversight of religious 
activity. It also served foreign policy ends in cultivat-
ing a positive image of Soviet religious policies in the 
Islamic world. 
The Tashkent-based Spiritual Administration was 
a hierarchical organisation. Ishankhan Babakhan ibn 
Abdulmajidkhan was appointed director, fulfilling the 
function of mufti, and the office remained in his family 
for almost as long as SADUM existed. The mufti pre-
sided over the decision-making Council of the ‘Ulamā 
and the SADUM offices (qāziyat, from qāzi “judge”) 
established in each of the Central Asian republics and 
responsible for oversight of registered mosques. Under 
the auspices of SADUM religious training resumed, 
producing qualified personnel for mosques, teaching 
and the administration of the Spiritual Administra-
tion and its regional branches. The renowned Bukhara 
Mir-i Arab medressa reopened in 1948, and in 1971 the 
Imam al-Buchari Institute was founded in Tashkent – as 
the only institute in the region to offer a number of 
hand-picked students from the republics (eight to ten 
Some Political and Legislative Aspects of Molding a ‘Soviet 
Islam’ in Central Asia”, in Central Asian Law: An Historical 
Overview, Festschrift for the Ninetieth Birthday of Herbert 
Franke, ed. Wallace Johnson and Irina F. Popova (Topeka, 
Kansas, 2004), 153–71 (159). 
12  On the following see Bachtijar Babadžanov, “SADUM”, in 
Islam na Territorii Byvšej Rossijskoj Imperii: Enciklopedičeskij Slovar’, 
ed. S. M. Prozorov (Moscow, 2003), 69–72; and idem, “Baba-
chanovy” [The Babakhanovs], ibid., 12–14; Bachtijar Baba-
džanov, “Sredneaziatskoe Duchovnoe Upravlenie Musul’man: 
Predistorija i Posledstvija Raspada” [SADUM: Prehistory and 
consequences of its dissolution], in Mnogomernye Granicy Cen-
tral’noj Azii, ed. Marta Brill Olcott and Aleksej Malašenko (Mos-
cow: Moskovskij Centr Karnegi, 2000), 55–69. 
13  Modelled on the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims 
of the Russian Empire established in Ufa in 1788, under Cath-
erine II. 
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Soviet Religion Policy and Discourse 
per year) higher Islamic education, now supplemented 
with non-religious disciplines. The Spiritual Adminis-
tration was also responsible for assembling delegations 
for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) and maintain-
ing contact with Muslims abroad. A SADUM Depart-
ment of International Relations was set up in 1961 
and selected students from the Tashkent Institute to 
study at universities in friendly Muslim countries 
(Egypt, Syria, Libya).14 
Probably the Spiritual Administration’s most 
important responsibility was to issue religious legal 
opinions (fatwa), which from 1947 were published in 
the journal The Muslims of the Soviet East.15 Most of the 
fatwas were prepared at the instructions of the Coun-
cil for Religious Affairs, which oversaw religious life in 
the Soviet Union in close consultation with the KGB, 
and also held authority over SADUM.16 Even formally, 
fatwas were couched as the implementation of decrees 
from the Communist Party, whose guiding principle 
was the struggle against harmful “remnants” of “back-
ward” practices. Correspondingly fatwas were directed 
not only against habits that contravened sharia, such 
as alcohol and magic (for example healing and for-
tune-telling) but also against a complex of non-norma-
tive practices that were regarded by the local Hanafite 
legal tradition as absolutely compatible with Islam. 
These included the lavish exchange of gifts at religious 
celebrations, the extended mourning ritual, and above 
all the Sufi rituals associated with veneration of charis-
matic figures: pilgrimages to holy sites and the reli-
gious activities associated with these. Justifying ver-
dicts against such practices therefore required draw-
ing on other legal traditions outside the Hanafite. 
There had already been attempts during the coloni-
al era to realign local religious practice on the pri-
mary sources – the divine commandments of the 
Koran and the body of recorded sayings and actions 
14  Ashirbek Muminov, Uygun Gafurov, and Rinat Shigabdi-
nov, “Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, 
in Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States, 
ed. Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika, and Stefan Reichmuth 
(London et al., 2010), 223–79 (250–52). 
15  On fatwas: Bachtijar Babadžanov, “O Fetwach SADUM 
Protiv ‘Neislamskich Obyčaev’” [On the SADUM fatwas against 
“un-Islamic customs”], in Islam Na Postsovetskom Prostranstve: 
Vzgljad Iznutri, ed. Aleksej Malašenko and Marta Brill Olcott 
(Moscow: Moskovskij Centr Karnegi, 2001), 170–84; Baba-
djanov, “From Colonization to Bolshevization” (see note 11), 
162–68. 
16  John Anderson, “The Council for Religious Affairs and 
the Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy”, Soviet Studies 43, no. 4 
(1991): 689–710. 
of the Prophet, the Sunnah – and leading representa-
tives of the Soviet ‘ulamā, including Ziauddin Baba-
khanov, who succeeded his father as mufti in 1957, 
had sympathised with these efforts.17 Saudi contacts 
cultivated by the Babakhan dynasty, imported writ-
ings by Hanbali scholars, and study visits by SADUM 
staff at Middle Eastern universities expanded the 
influence of Arab ritual purism among the Central 
Asian scholars.18 Some fatwas even contain references 
to religious custom in Saudi Arabia as the home of 
Islam.19 Thus the ‘ulamā of the SADUM, in their striv-
ing to carry out the instructions of the Party ideolo-
gists while at the same time remaining true to their 
religion, in fact paved the way for the reformist and 
modernist currents that later became known as 
“Wahabi” and “Salafist”. 
The Spiritual Administration had a hybrid status. 
On the one hand there was a principle of separation 
of state and religion; on the other SADUM was part of 
the state bureaucracy and answerable to its organs. 
Consequently it was perceived in the first place as an 
executive organ of the state, whose authority to regu-
late the religious life of Muslims stood in contradic-
tion to the firmly anchored hermeneutic principle of 
ijtihād (“utmost endeavour”), which encourages quali-
fied jurists (mujtahid) to exercise independent reason-
ing on matters where neither the primary texts nor 
other scholars provide unambiguous guidance.20 Many 
religious actors thus regarded SADUM’s fatwas on 
dogma and law as non-binding.21 
The hujra (literally “room [in medressa]”) became 
the place to debate which practices conformed with 
the Hanafiya and which were “heresies” (bid‘a) contra-
vening sharia. Above all in the Uzbek and Tajik parts 
of the Ferghana Valley from the 1920s, these private 
teaching circles (as well as numerous unregistered 
mosques) became a refuge of Islamic education where 
the traditional forms of learning (with the centrality 
of the relationship between teacher and student) lived 
on.22 In the 1960s these circles brought forth an in-
17  Ashirbek Muminov, “Fundamentalist Challenges to Local 
Islamic Traditions in Soviet and Post-Soviet Central Asia”, 
in Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia, ed. Uyama Tomo-
hiko (Sapporo, 2007), 249–61 (256f.). 
18  Muminov et al., “Islamic Education” (see note 14), 273. 
19  Babadžanov, “O Fetwach SADUM” (see note 15), 176. 
20  Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory 
of Ijtihād”, American Journal of Comparative Law 26, no. 2 (1978): 
199–212. 
21  Babadžanov, “O Fetwach SADUM” (see note 15), 178. 
22  Muminov, “Fundamentalist Challenges” (see note 17), 
258f. 
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Soviet Islam and the Renaissance of Religion 
creasingly critical mass of scholars who challenged 
the legitimacy of rulings by “government” ‘ulamā. 
However, the religious authorities of the hujra were 
anything but a homogeneous group. In fact there were 
many biographical and personal interconnections 
between them and the ‘ulamā of the Spiritual Admin-
istration,23 and they had often been trained by the 
same teachers. The hujra were also a long way from a 
unified Islam discourse. The authorities teaching there 
included some who defended traditional Hanafite 
positions (even against SADUM fatwas), and others 
who accepted none of the schools of law and regarded 
Koran and Hadith (or the Koran alone) as the sole 
source of “correct” religious practice.24 
In the 1970s the hitherto marginal current that 
followed the reformist tradition gained in strength. 
These “young mullahs”, as they were known, argued 
vehemently for a revitalisation of Islam by returning 
to the primary sources. Their opponents called them 
“Wahabis” in reference to the Arab Wahabism that 
had become a synonym for the purist currents in 
Islam during the Soviet era (and remained so there-
after).25 In questions of doctrine and orthopraxy, these 
“young mullahs” or “renewers” (mujaddidin), as they 
called themselves, espoused different positions. But 
what united them was their opposition to the tradi-
tionalism and conservatism of the Hanafite ‘ulamā 
and to its quietist stance on political questions.26 
In 1973 one of these renewers, Said Abdullo Nuri, 
founded a youth organisation in the Tajik SSR called 
Nahzati Javononi Islomii Tojikiston (Revival of the Islamic 
23  Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “From Revival to Mutation: The 
Religious Personnel of Islam in Tajikistan, from De-Staliniza-
tion to Independence (1955–91)”, Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 
(2011): 53–80. 
24  Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov, “Damulla 
Hindustani and the Beginning of the ‘Great Schism’ among 
the Muslims of Uzbekistan”, in Islam in Politics in Russia and 
Central Asia (Early Eighteenth – Late Twentieth Centuries), ed. Sté-
phane A. Dudoignon and Hisao Komatsu (London et al., 2001), 
195–220; Muminov et al., “Islamic Education” (see note 14), 
252–54; Babadžanov, “Sredneaziatskoe Duchovnoe Uprav-
lenie Musul’man” (see note 12), 57f. 
25  Babadjanov and Kamilov, “Damulla Hindustani” (see 
note 24), 200–206. 
26  Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, “Islam in Uzbekistan: From the 
Struggle for ‘Religious Purity’ to Political Activism”, in Central 
Asia: A Gathering Storm? ed. Boris Rumer (Armonk and London, 
2002), 299–330 (310–12). 
Youth of Tajikistan) which laid the foundations for 
the later Nahzat party.27 
The Return of Religion 
The 1980s ushered in a phase of opening and trans-
formation of the religious landscape. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (where Central Asian 
cadres were also involved), and the Iranian Revolution 
the same year, sparked a wave of solidarity among 
the Muslims of Central Asian. The subsequent political 
and economic liberalisation in the course of the re-
structuring of Soviet society (perestroika) initiated under 
Mikhail Gorbachev dynamised the religious field in an 
unforeseen manner. The religious freedom law adopted 
by the Supreme Soviet in October 1990, replacing the 
law on religion of 1929,28 permitted religious institu-
tions to resume their core functions of charitable 
activity and religious instruction. Closed mosques and 
medressas reopened, clandestinely run ones operated 
openly, and new ones were established, often with 
financial support from Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. 
The new law now also made it easier to import reli-
gious literature from Saudi Arabia and the Middle 
East and thus enabled free access to the Koran (posses-
sion of which had hitherto been severely restricted) 
and other religious writings including the theorists 
of politicised pan-Islamism (such as Hassan al-Banna 
and Sayyid Qutb, the spiritual fathers of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood). And the new law was also 
accompanied by a physical opening of the borders, 
which eased networking with Muslim institutions 
abroad. Soviet Muslims could now undertake the pil-
grimage to Mecca, and missionaries and representa-
tives of organisations with all kinds of messages 
flooded into the region.29 
In this rapidly changing political and cultural 
context, the generation of reformist and increasingly 
internationalist Muslim intellectuals gained greater 
leeway for political activity and propaganda. This met 
with resistance among the Hanafite ‘ulamā, who 
rejected not only the dogmatic and ritual innovations 
of the “Wahabis” but also their demands for an Islamic 
27  Qiomiddin Sattorī, ed., 30 sol HNIT – zodai ormoni mardum 
[30 years of IRPT– born from the ideals of the nation] (Dushan-
be, 2003), 6. 
28  Anderson, “The Council for Religious Affairs” (see 
note 16), 703f. 
29  Muminov et al., “Islamic Education” (see note 14), 254ff; 
Khalid, Islam after Communism (see note 7), 118–25. 
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The Return of Religion 
state. The religious dispute increasingly escalated into 
conflict, which was ultimately carried into the Spiri-
tual Administration and accelerated its dissolution.30 
Shortly before this occurred, some of the reformers-
founded an Islamic Renaissance Party in Astrakhan, which 
stood for a revival of Islamic values and the establish-
ment of an Islamic state in Central Asia.31 But this 
transnational impetus was soon overtaken by local 
agendas and conflicts when the Soviet Union broke 
apart at the end of 1991. An attempt to establish an 
Uzbek branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party in the Uz-
bek part of the Ferghana Valley, where the politicised 
“Wahabis” were especially active, was blocked by the 
united resistance of the state and the Hanafite ‘ulamā. 
A number of groups that emerged at this point were 
banned and shifted their activities abroad (see pp. 20f.). 
In Tajikistan the development of political Islam 
took a different course. Like in Uzbekistan the origins 
of the movement lay in the Islamic parallel society of 
the Soviet era. It consisted of a network of young mul-
lahs and their students and stood, as in Uzbekistan, in 
sharp opposition to both the communist cadres and 
the Hanafite establishment of the Spiritual Adminis-
tration. The desire for national self-determination and 
political reform united reformers around Said Abdullo 
Nuri with secular intellectuals who had also begun 
to organise politically in the later years of perestroika. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declara-
tion of Tajik independence in September 1991 sharp-
ened the antagonism between pro-Communist forces 
and groups seeking change. In October the Tajik Islam-
ists left the Union-wide Renaissance Party, founded 
their own Islamic Renaissance Party (Hizbi Nahzati Islomii 
Tojikiston; in the following, Nahzat) and joined an in-
formal alliance with nationalist and democratic oppo-
sition groups to stand a joint candidate in the presi-
dential election scheduled for November.32 
This process brought the Islamists closer to the dis-
courses of their coalition partners. The ultimate objec-
tive of establishing an Islamic state, which originally 
30  Babadžanov, “Sredneaziatskoe Duchovnoe Upravlenie 
Musul’man” (see note 12), 59–64; Babadzhanov, “Islam in 
Uzbekistan” (see note 26), 309–14. 
31  Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Political Parties and Forces in 
Tajikistan, 1989–1993”, in Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence, 
ed. Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Frédéric Grare, and Shirin 
Akiner (Richmond, 1998), 52–85 (63f.). 
32  Parviz Mullojonov, “The Islamic Clergy in Tajikistan since 
the End of the Soviet Period”, in Islam in Politics in Russia and 
Central Asia, ed. Dudoignon and Komatsu (see note 24), 221–
25, 237–39. 
played a prominent role in their repertoire, receded 
in favour of appeals for a “national” awakening and 
a revitalisation of Persian and Islamic cultural herit-
age.33 These demands were also supported by parts 
of the ‘ulamā. In 1988 Akbar Turajonzoda, one of the 
young reformers within SADUM and son of a well-
known Sufi authority, was elected chief judge (qāzi 
kalon) of the Tajik branch of the Spiritual Administra-
tion and thus the country’s supreme Islamic authori-
ty. Turajonzoda, who had also been a member of the 
Tajik Supreme Soviet since 1990, argued not only for 
the official institutionalisation of fundamental Islamic 
customs (such as Muslim holidays) but also for the offi-
cial registration of Nahzat as a political party.34 But 
the post-communist regime of Rahmon Nabiev held 
stubbornly to the status quo, denying the opposition 
alliance any participation in power – even after the 
respectable showing of 31 percent for its presidential 
candidate, a well-known film director. 
The ensuing power struggle initially took the form 
of demonstrations and occupations of central public 
squares in the capital Dushanbe, but escalated in spring 
1992 when Nabiev’s inner circle armed militias from 
the south and brought them to the capital.35 The un-
folding violence led to a brutal civil war that affected 
the south of the country worst of all. The war was 
driven largely by antagonisms between regional power 
networks. Structurally fostered by the country’s frag-
mented political geography and a regionalism that 
was already pronounced in Soviet times, these ten-
sions were exacerbated by two factors: firstly, a Soviet 
practice of elite recruitment that had favoured par-
ticular regions (Leninabad, today Khujand, in the Fer-
ghana Valley and Kulob in the south); and secondly a 
mass resettlement from the mountains to the valleys 
in the course of the rapid expansion of cotton culti-
vation. Especially in the densely populated Vakhsh 
Valley, this created a precarious coexistence of com-
munities with different political identities and loyal-
33  Dudoignon, “Political Parties and Forces” (see note 31), 
65–67. 
34  Mullojonov, “The Islamic Clergy” (see note 32), 234–36; 
Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Islamic Clerical Establishment in 
Central Asia”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 20, no. 2 
(1997): 73–102 (95–97). 
35  On this and the following: Bess Brown, “The Civil War in 
Tajikistan, 1992–1993”, in Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence, 
ed. Djalili et al. (see note 31), 86–96 (90–95); Dudoignon, 
“Political Parties and Forces” (see note 31), 70–73; Mullojonov, 
“The Islamic Clergy” (see note 32), 240–43; and (on the regional 
dynamic) 231–34; also Vitaly Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central 
Asia: Between Pen and Rifle (Lanham et al., 2005), 213–35. 
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Soviet Islam and the Renaissance of Religion 
ties who now became embroiled in a “war of the kolk-
hozes”.36 Because the Islamist faction’s strongholds 
were largely in the marginalised regions from which 
the resettlers came, while the regime’s militias were 
mostly recruited from long-time residents of the south, 
whole families were wiped out in the violence simply 
on the basis of features identifying origin. 
The militias of the post-communist regime, com-
posed largely of Kulobis and Uzbeks and supported 
massively with arms by Uzbekistan, later also by Russia, 
quickly gained the upper hand. In winter 1992 Nah-
zat’s leaders fled to exile in Afghanistan under the 
protection of Pashtun and Tajik mujahideen, along 
with about one hundred thousand refugees. Other 
opposition members went to Moscow. But that did not 
mean the war was over. While the regime in Dushanbe 
consolidated, replacing Nabiev with Emomali Rahmon, 
a sovkhoz director from Kulob who had been appointed 
leader of the Tajik Supreme Soviet in September 1992, 
its opponents conducted a guerrilla war in the largely 
inaccessible regions of Gharm and the Pamirs, which 
had remained under the control of opposition war-
lords. 
UN-brokered peace talks began in 1994 between 
Dushanbe and the opposition, which had joined to 
form the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) where Nahzat 
remained the dominant force. For a long time the 
talks went nowhere because the regime, paying heed 
to Russian sensitivities, refused to share power with 
the UTO. Not until 1997, after the victory of the Tali-
ban shifted the balance of forces in Afghanistan and 
consequently the interests of Russia and Iran, was it 
possible to reach an agreement between the parties. 
The peace agreement, signed by President Emomali 
Rahmon (elected in 1994), and Nahzat leader Said 
Abdullo Nuri, guaranteed the UTO a share of power in 
government on the basis of a 30 percent quota. It also 
gave Nahzat the status of a legal party.37 
The peace agreement consolidated the power of 
President Rahmon, who championed the secular state 
model, remained strongly dependent on financial and 
political support from Russia, and showed no incli-
nation to break with the ideological legacy of the Soviet 
Union. But Islam had unmistakably returned to the 
daily lives of the population, and unlike its Soviet 
predecessors the Rahmon regime refrained from anti-
religious propaganda. Since the 1980s growing inter-
36  Olivier Roy, La nouvelle Asie Centrale, ou la fabrication des 
nations (Paris, 1997), 154f. 
37  Mullojonov, “The Islamic Clergy” (see note 32), 245f. 
est in national history and culture, in whose rediscov-
ery and reinvention secular intellectuals and academ-
ics were central,38 had also enhanced the status of the 
Islamic heritage. This was now seen no longer as an 
expression of backwardness, but as an uncontested 
component of the national culture. Reference to reli-
gious symbolism was consequently politically impera-
tive and was demonstratively practised: taking the 
oath of office on the Koran, the president attending 
the hajj (1997) and the declaration of an “Imam Azam 
Year” in 2009 to honour the founder of the Hanafite 
school, Abu Hanifa (who was declared “son of the Tajik 
nation” for the occasion), to name just a few exam-
ples.39 The public presentation of Islamic tradition, 
with which the post-Soviet regime sought to political-
ly instrumentalise the return of religion to society, 
could not, however, disguise the fact that its ideologi-
cal hegemony was by no means secure. 
 
 
38  Khalid, Islam after Communism (see note 7), 126f; Dudoi-
gnon, “Political Parties and Forces” (see note 31), 65–67. 
39  “Annual Address to the Majlisi Oli of the Republic 
of Tajikistan”, 24 April 2010, http://www.prezident.tj/en/ 
node/2190. 
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Mosques, the Supreme Council of the ‘Ulamā and the Islamic Centre 
Islamic Institutions, Authorities and Groups 
 
The religious renaissance initiated by the political 
transformations of the late 1980s led to a differentia-
tion and pluralisation of the religious field. The his-
torical exclusion of Islamic education from schools 
and universities and systematic atheist propaganda 
had left the general population with only rudimentary 
knowledge of Islam. This generally extended no fur-
ther than the Islam of “custom and habit” (urf, adat), 
in the sense of the basic religious rites, practices and 
behavioural norms that had survived the Soviet era 
through being handed down, largely independently 
of class, in families and neighbourhoods.40 The domullo 
or mullah, who provided religious advice and services 
and were consulted principally for the rites of passage 
(birth, circumcision, marriage and death) and in situa-
tions of physical or emotional distress, generally also 
drew their religious knowledge from the same sources.41 
The new freedom of religion therefore brought with it 
great demand for religious education and instruction, 
which was further amplified by the opening of the 
media. Unhindered access to religious literature – of 
differing types and qualities – altered the forms and 
institutions of the communication of knowledge. This 
manifested itself in a growing number of actors claim-
ing authority in religious matters and calling for life 
to be lived according to the rules of Islam. These actors 
are described in greater detail in the following. 
40  The author’s discussion partners distinguished merely 
between “religious” and “unreligious” families, where the 
former were not restricted to those from the provincial rural 
and academic proletariat. Instead the “religious” included in 
particular “good families” belonging to or close to the Com-
munist nomenklatura, who at the same time held particular-
ly conservative values and an interest in preserving Islamic 
traditions (as “good manners”). This was not seen as any con-
tradiction to communist ideals. 
41  Nazif Shahrani, “Local Knowledge of Islam and Social Dis-
course in Afghanistan and Turkistan in the Modern Period”, 
in Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective, ed. Robert L. Canfield 
(Cambridge, 1991), 161–80 (166–75). 
Mosques, the Supreme Council of the ‘Ulamā 
and the Islamic Centre 
Mosques, whose numbers have leapt since 1990, are 
of central importance for the interaction of Muslims 
in public space. Whereas in 1990 only seventeen were 
officially registered in the whole country, the number 
rose to almost four thousand by summer 2013.42 
Mosques fulfil a range of social functions. They are not 
only the location of communal worship, prayer and 
religious teaching, but also a locale to meet socially 
and exchange news, and an informal meeting space 
for the members of the local congregation (mahalla) 
or village. Funded exclusively through donations and 
exempt from taxes, mosques organise a broad spec-
trum of charitable services, ranging from pastoral care 
to material assistance for the needy (often in the form 
of food and goods). 
Mosques are decentralised institutions. A new 
mosque may be established in a community of at least 
one hundred (for Friday mosques ten thousand) at the 
request of a group of at least ten founders.43 Once a 
construction permit has been issued and a religious 
association registered, the mosque organises itself 
largely autonomously. The religious personnel of 
neighbourhood and village mosques – often only an 
imam (prayer leader), a deputy and a guardian (who 
often also acts as the muezzin, calling the faithful to 
prayer) – is chosen from among the congregation by 
the ten-member mosque committee. Formal religious 
education is not an automatic precondition; moral 
integrity, piety and social authority are much more 
decisive. 
The approximately four hundred Friday mosques 
occupy a crucial position for the shaping of mass reli-
42  According to a verbal report from the state Committee for 
Religious Affairs, 3,493 of these were community or neigh-
bourhood mosques (masjidi panjvaqt), and 407 Friday mosques 
(masjidi jum‘a) (July 2013). Some discussion partners believed 
there to be a large number of unregistered mosques. 
43  The number required in the capital Dushanbe is higher: 
Qonuni Jumhurii Tojikiston “Dar Borai Ozodii Vijdon Va Ittihodiyahoi 
Dinī” [Law of the Republic of Tajikistan “On the freedom of 
belief and religious association”], (Dushanbe, 2009), chap. 3, 
art. 11 (3) and (4). 
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giosity, as they form the link between the congrega-
tions and the state structures, the lay believers and 
the ‘ulamā. They reach a much larger proportion of 
the population than the neighbourhood mosques. 
On Muslim holidays thousands of worshippers gather 
here to hear a sermon (mav‘iza) and pray together. 
Only the heads of Friday mosques (imam khatib) are 
authorised to read the Friday prayer (khutba) and preach 
in public, making them key figures in the field of reli-
gion. In the sense that they communicate the norma-
tive foundations of the symbolic order to a broad audi-
ence their function is at the same time a genuinely 
political one. 
Candidates for these positions are also put forward 
from the local level. But approval is required from a 
state organ, the Committee for Religious Affairs,44 in con-
sultation with the Islamic Centre (markazi islomī). The 
Islamic Centre is the successor to the Qāziat, which 
took over supervision of the field of religion in Tajiki-
stan after the dissolution of SADUM. In 1992 the 
Qāziat was transformed into a muftiate in a move that 
formally enhanced the status of the ‘ulamā.45 But the 
decision was reversed in 1996, when the muftiate was 
abolished and replaced with a Supreme Council of the 
‘Ulamā (shuroi olī ulamoi dinī Tojikiston).46 Its administra-
tive arm, the Religious Administration (idorai din), was 
turned into the Islamic Centre in 2010 and transformed 
into a departmental umbrella organisation. The Coun-
cil of the ‘Ulamā, which consists of twenty-five senior 
members of the ‘ulamā (almost all of them exercising 
the function of imam khatib) occupies a special position 
within this system. It is the corporate entity represent-
ing the Centre, possesses the right to issue fatwas, 
tests the religious knowledge of khatibs and elects the 
mufti, who in turn heads the Council of the ‘Ulamā 
and the Islamic Centre.47 As such the ‘ulamā forms a 
relatively coherent body, comparable to a clergy. But 
its potential power is effectively contained by the law 
on religion. The law emphasises the constitutional 
separation of state and religion and grants the Islamic 
44  Ibid., chap. 3, art. 11 (6). The full name is Kumitai din, tan-
zimi an‘ana va jashnu marosimhoi milliī Tojikiston [Committee for 
religion and regulation of traditions, festivals and national 
rituals]. See p. 27. 
45  And possibly for the same reason that led to the creation 
of SADUM in 1943: to bind the ‘ulamā to the regime during 
wartime. This became particularly pressing after Akbar Tura-
jonzoda, qāzi kalon, joined the opposition in 1992. 
46  On the background: Mullojonov, “The Islamic Clergy” 
(see note 32), 256f. 
47  According to staff of the Islamic Centre and members 
of the ‘ulamā (Dushanbe and Sughd, summer 2013). 
Centre the status of an “extraordinary” religious 
organisation.48 At the same time the law subordinates 
all religious institutions under the state Committee 
for Religious Affairs, which possesses sweeping plan-
ning and control functions (see below, p. 27). 
The Council of the ‘Ulamā thus has a similar hy-
brid status to the Soviet-era Spiritual Administration 
(see pp. 8f.), but with reduced scope: the law grants 
it certain powers but no authority to issue directives, 
because in the final instance the decisions of the Com-
mittee for Religious Affairs are binding on religious 
institutions at all levels. While the ‘ulamā may play an 
advisory role here, its main function is to implement 
the decisions of the Committee for Religious Affairs 
and contribute to oversight and disciplining of reli-
gious institutions. 
The most important instruments here are the regu-
lar testing of the qualifications of imams introduced 
in 2007,49 participation in drafting curricula for the 
six officially registered medressas,50 the Islamic Lycee 
in Dushanbe and the country’s only Islamic universi-
ty,51 organising training for serving imams through 
the Training Centre for Imam Khatibs established in 2010,52 
and participating in compiling approved texts for the 
Friday sermons, which the Committee for Religious 
Affairs sends to the imams weekly and whose obser-
vance is monitored (at least sporadically).53 The train-
ing measures also draw on experienced imams who 
are not members of the Council of the ‘Ulamā. Finally, 
the payment of salaries to the khatibs of the Friday 
mosques, introduced in spring 2014, which makes 
them de facto state employees, is of special signifi-
cance for ensuring the loyalty of the religious elite.54 
Their corporate status is also underlined by the uni-
form apparel introduced in spring 2014. 
48  Qonuni Jumhurii Tojikiston “Dar Borai Ozodii Vijdon Va Ittihodi-
yahoi Dinī” (see note 43), chap. 2, art. 5 (2) and chap. 3, art. 9 (2). 
49  Farangis Najibullah, “Tajikistan: Authorities Impose Reli-
gious Tests on Imams”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
9 August 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078040. 
html. 
50  As of summer 2014. 
51  Donishgohi Islomī Imomi Azam Abu Hanifa (Dushanbe), also 
formally under the auspices of the Islamic Centre.  
52  Markazi Bozomuzī Imom Khatibon. 
53  Discussions with representatives of the Committee for 
Religious Affairs in Sughd und Khatlon (2013/2014). 
54  Mechrangez Tursunzoda, “Muftij ozvučil primernuju 
zarplatu imam-khatibov”, Asia Plus, 14 January 2014, http:// 
www.news.tj/ru/news/muftii-ozvuchil-primernuyu-zarplatu-
imam-khatibov. 
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Independent Authorities 
In this way the law on religion binds religious per-
sonnel to the secular regime and ensures the emer-
gence of a uniform professional profile in harmony 
with the secular ideology of the state. This is especially 
significant in relation to the younger generation of 
imams, whose religious socialisation occurred in the 
post-Soviet period. Many of them studied for years at 
Middle Eastern, Saudi or Pakistani universities and 
thus in a context that differs starkly from that of the 
post-Soviet states. Their educational experiences are 
very different to those of the older generation of 
imams – many of whom also spent time studying 
in other Muslim countries in the 1990s, but whose 
religious understanding of the world was largely 
formed in the colleges of the Soviet era, in Bukhara 
and Tashkent, where they internalised a homogenous 
canon tailored to the needs of a secular ideology. 
Independent Authorities 
Alongside the imams officially authorised to preach 
to a mass audience and for that purpose have at their 
disposal the powerful resource of the mosque, there is 
also an almost endless number of independent author-
ities offering religious services. These range from 
authoritative voices like the Turajonzoda brothers (see 
below), to domullo who gather only a small number of 
students and do not necessarily disclose their activi-
ties to outsiders. 
Many of them originate from families that emigrat-
ed to Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Islamic coun-
tries during the civil war, or sent their children away 
to study (in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran). Many 
of them left Tajikistan for economic rather than 
religious reasons and only embraced Islam in Cairo, 
Medina, Islamabad or Tehran.55 Many of these foreign 
students were recalled to the country in autumn 2010 
after the Tajik government realised the extent of edu-
cational emigration and its apparently uncontrollable 
repercussions on the country’s religious discourse.56 
55  David M. Abramson, Foreign Religious Education and the Cen-
tral Asian Islamic Revival: Impact and Prospects for Stability, Silk 
Road Paper (Washington: Central Asia/Caucasus Institute and 
Silk Road Studies Program, March 2010), 36–41. 
56  Zarina Ergasheva, “Tajikistan: Islamic Students Told to 
Come Home”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 24 
November 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf4f7b6c. 
html. Subsequently a package of legal amendments was 
adopted to tighten control of religious activity: Alexander 
Sodiqov, “Bill Banning Children from Mosques Adopted in 
But after returning to Tajikistan they find little oppor-
tunity for employment. Despite possessing religious 
qualifications from foreign universities, entry to the 
Tajik establishment is barred to most. Not only does 
the number of candidates significantly exceed the 
number of available posts at mosques, medressas and 
other educational institutions,57 but their qualifica-
tions are not recognised (or only after an additional 
study at Dushanbe Islamic University). Moreover, 
those who enter mosque service are expected to con-
form to a code of conduct that demands modesty 
(khoksorī) and subordination (itoat), which some re-
turnees regard as an affront.58 For they speak fluent 
Arabic – often better than the established imams – 
and often possess deeper knowledge of Islam than the 
generation trained during the Soviet era. The latter 
still enjoy great respect, especially as some studied 
under notable hujra authorities and thus belong to the 
tradition that guarded Islam under a hostile regime. 
But a growing segment of youth follow representatives 
of the post-Soviet generation whose dress, speech and 
habitus distinguish them from the Soviet-era domullo, 
and who challenge the traditional religious authori-
ties and embody a “modern” Islam. 
Many of the returnees give private lessons (sabaq). 
Although private Arabic and religion instruction 
was given throughout the Soviet era to make up for 
the lack of religious education (see above, pp. 9f.), 
the popularity and demand of such courses has been 
increasing rapidly since independence. Parents who 
send their children to private religious instruction see 
it as a central component of moral education offering 
orientation in a world that has become confusing.59 
Tajikistan”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 8, no. 124 (28 June 2011): 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38104#. 
VDKVBGOqJKo. Now particular conditions must be fulfilled 
before studying at an Islamic university abroad: Abdukajum 
Kajumzod, “Mulloj možet stat’ ne každyj” [Not everyone can 
become a mullah], Radio Ozodi, 25 May 2011, http://rus.ozodi. 
org/content/changes_in_religious_law_/24200767.html. 
57  Out of 2,705 students who had been brought back from 
foreign Islamic universities by January 2014 (out of a regis-
tered total of 2,874), only 237 had found places at Tajik edu-
cation institutions by January 2013: Mechrangez Tursunzoda, 
“Cholikov: V islamskich stranach na segodnjašnij den’ osta-
jutsja 169 tadžikskich studentov” [Kholikov: 169 Tajik stu-
dents still in Muslim countries], Asia Plus, 14 January 2013, 
http://www.news.tj/ru/news/kholikov-v-islamskikh-stranakh-
na-segodnyashnii-den-ostayutsya-169-tadzhikskikh-studentov. 
58  Discussions with returnees and established imams (2013/ 
2014). 
59  Manja Stephan, “Education, Youth and Islam: The Grow-
ing Popularity of Private Religious Lessons in Dushanbe, 
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But it is not only children who are sent to a domullo. 
Young adults and even members of the parental gen-
eration attend religious circles to learn about “true” 
Islam or to make up what they missed earlier. Many 
young women attend private religion courses with 
female religious instructors (bibī otun, otunbucha). Their 
motivations are diverse. Interest in Islamic values and 
their implications for family life and raising children 
are naturally foremost. But such courses often also 
offer the only opportunity to escape the confines of the 
home for a time and meet together with other women. 
Acquiring religious knowledge also offers a possibility 
to enhancing their status vis-à-vis their husbands and 
in the family. 
But these private teachers are taking great risks, 
because since 2011 a licence has been required for 
private religious instruction.60 Those who teach with-
out one, and thus illegally, therefore have every reason 
to be discreet about their activities. Of course this 
does nothing to bring clarity to the informal religious 
scene. Instead the ban on private religious teaching 
exacerbates the general trend for decentralisation in 
the religious field and contributes to it becoming ever 
less transparent. The growing importance of the inter-
net and virtual social networks – which are increasing-
ly used as media for communication on religion – plays 
an important role in this connection, increasing both 
the supply of advice and the demand for religious 
teaching. 
That demand is served professionally and systemat-
ically by a website (www.turajon.org) run by three 
prominent religious authorities, the Turajonzoda 
brothers. Under the heading savolu javob (“questions 
and answers”) they publish fatwas addressing ques-
tions of sharia and the religious way of life.61 The 
internet presence of the Turajonzoda brothers dem-
onstrates very well how the global trend of religion 
decoupling from both the state and established reli-
gious institutions, observed in connection with the 
Tajikistan”, in Youth in the Former Soviet South: Everyday Lives 
between Experimentation and Regulation, special issue of Central 
Asian Survey 29, no. 4 (2010): 469–83. 
60  Sodiqov, “Bill Banning Children from Mosques” (see note 
56); see also Zakon RT “Ob otvetstvennosti roditelej za obučenie i 
vospitanie detej” [Law of RT “On the responsibility of parents 
for the education of their children”], chap. 2 (9), http:// 
islamnews.tj/legislation.html. 
61  On the website and the brothers’ biographies, see Tim 
Epkenhans and Shahnoza Nozimova, “Negotiating Islam in 
Emerging Public Spheres in Contemporary Tajikistan”, Asia-
tische Studien/Études Asiatiques 67, no. 3 (2013): 965–90 (971–84). 
fatwa discussion, has arrived in Tajikistan.62 The 2012 
decision by the Islamic Centre to do the same and set 
up its own website (www.muftiyat.tj) suggests that the 
Council of the ‘Ulamā has recognised which way the 
wind is blowing and feels forced to respond. In Janu-
ary 2013, shortly after launching its website,63 the 
Islamic Centre issued a fatwa in which the Council 
of the ‘Ulamā called for religious actors to exercise 
restraint in publishing fatwas, on the grounds that 
such pluralism was dangerous. For statements on 
problems of religious law, it asserted, the Islamic 
Centre held sole responsibility.64 
This intervention is unlikely to have done anything 
to reduce the attractiveness of competitors who are 
independent and well-versed in the use of electronic 
media. But their influence is limited too, and there 
is no sign yet that “the internet has changed the pat-
terns of giving advice radically”.65 The popularity of 
online advice is no substitute for direct interaction 
between a religious authority (domullo, mudaris) and his 
followers or students (shogird, murid). Whether a domullo 
teaches privately or works as an imam in a state-licensed 
mosque and receives students and advice-seekers 
between prayer times is secondary. What is central for 
his authority are his reputation as an expert (olim) of 
the faith and his personal charisma. The choice of who 
to follow and who to seek for advice depends on indi-
vidual biographical and local networks, and the choice 
is rarely exclusive. Instruction from one of the mudaris 
of the younger generation, who have studied at a 
respected Islamic university abroad, is often supple-
mented by participation in a discussion circle (gap) 
held by a domullo of the Soviet generation.66 Thus the 
pluralisation of sources of religious instruction does 
not necessarily erode the importance of the tradition-
al channels. But the greater diversity of actors and 
62  Johannes Reissner, Islam in der Weltgesellschaft: Wege in eine 
eigene Moderne, SWP-Studie 19/2007 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, July 2007), 24. 
63  Its “Questions and Answers” section is apparently little-
used, possibly due to the website’s obvious lack of mainte-
nance. 
64  Abdullo Ašurov, “Sovet ulemov Tadžikistana zajavil, čto 
nikto ne imeet prava vynosit’ fetvy bez ich razrešenija” [Spiri-
tual Administration of Tajikistan declares that nobody has 
the right to issue legal opinions without its approval], Radio 
Ozodi, 20 January 2013, http://rus.ozodi.org/content/article/ 
24878680.html. 
65  Epkenhans/Nozimova, “Negotiating Islam” (see note 61), 
967. 
66  Discussions with scholars and students in Sughd and 
Khatlon (2013/2014). 
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The Islamic Renaissance Party 
communication media does lead to a growing poly-
phony on normative questions. This makes it increas-
ingly difficult for the religious elite to defend its posi-
tion as legitimate representative of the symbolic order. 
The Islamic Renaissance Party 
Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston (Nahzat) occupies a spe-
cial position among the actors in the field of religion. 
Its status as a legal political party stems from the 
peace agreement of 1997, which guaranteed the oppo-
sition a share in power (see above, p. 14). The agree-
ment led in 1999 to a constitutional amendment that 
emphasises the secular character of the state but per-
mits the establishment of religious parties, and thus 
opened the way for Nahzat’s integration into the po-
litical system.67 That integration process, manifested 
above all in participation in parliamentary elections 
(since 2000), required the party to make compromises 
with the post-communist regime that alienated former 
supporters and allies – but also paved the way for stra-
tegic realignment and modernisation. 
That process was initiated under Said Abdullo Nuri, 
who was reelected as leader in 1999.68 After his death 
in 2006 he was succeeded by his protégé Muhiddin 
Kabiri against the resistance of the conservatives in 
the party. Kabiri was a newcomer who played no part 
in the civil war (unlike most of Nahzat’s leadership), 
possesses a secular education and supports the sepa-
ration of religion and politics. He has consistently con-
tinued the modernisation course set by Nuri. Under 
his leadership Nahzat has developed into a parliamen-
tary party whose programme appears positively “post-
Islamist”.69 Today the party’s statutes reflect nothing 
of its days as champion of Muslim interests, seeking 
an Islamisation of society.70 Islam now appears only as 
a general frame of reference for goals and activities so 
inclusive that the entire spectrum from conservative 
religious to secular intelligentsia can feel equally com-
fortable. The statutes convey the image of a respecta-
ble mainstream party that respects liberal and demo-
67  Konstitutsijai (Sarqonuni) Jumhurii Tojikiston, chap. 1, art. 1 
and chap. 2, art. 28, http://www.prezident.tj/ru/taxonomy/ 
term/5/112. 
68  Naumkin, Radical Islam (see note 35), 236–40, 243–56. 
69  Ihsan Yilmaz, “An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportuni-
ties and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case”, 
Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika 5, no. 18 (2009): 133–47. 
70  Dudoignon, “Political Parties and Forces” (see note 31), 
64–67. 
cratic principles (freedom of conscience and opinion, 
multi-party system, free elections) on the basis of Is-
lamic values, but subjugates the latter to the national 
interest rather than absolutising it over other beliefs.71 
The Islamist character of Nahzat, which remains 
almost invisible in its external projection, does none-
theless play a role in the everyday life of the party, 
where the distinction between “what is Islamic and 
what is not”72 plays a central role both in internal self-
description and in the framing of its adversaries.73 
Typologically Nahzat is thus akin to a protest move-
ment that criticises perceived social and economic 
asymmetries from the perspective of an ideal society, 
namely, one governed by Islamic values. This ideal 
society is democratic, participatory and egalitarian, 
and thus the opposite of what the present regime 
embodies in the eyes of its critics, whether Islamist or 
secular. Typically, criticism of the regime in the name 
of Islam (as the epitome of democracy and social jus-
tice) is tied to da‘wa, the call to Islam,74 which plays an 
important role in the Nahzat’s recruitment practice. 
Here religious knowledge is a central resource, but not 
the only one. 
To that extent the description of Nahzat as a “post-
Islamist” party is only partly true. But it is unmistaka-
ble that Nahzat is seeking to emancipate itself from its 
role as a protest party. Its willingness to work con-
structively within existing institutions and agree com-
promises with the government, which have character-
ised its political stance since its institutionalisation, is 
recognisable at all levels of the party. In its struggle 
for recognition as a political player Nahzat differs fun-
damentally from other Islamist groups and parties, 
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the (not openly political) 
Salafiya, as well as from jihadist groups like the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, and Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh, which 
propagate stricter ethical and cultural norms and a 
clearer and more coherent Islamist programme than 
71  Guaranteeing religious liberties (as part of civil liberties) 
is explicitly mentioned: Oinnomai Hizbi Nahzati Islomii Tojikiston 
[Statutes of the Islamic Renaissance Party] (1.4), http://nahzat.tj/ 
dar-borai-hnit/oinnoma; on democracy, see Rahmatulloi 
Rajab, “Demokratia va Intikhobot” [Democracy and elections], 
Nahzat.tj, 16 January 2015, http://nahzat.tj/13867-demokratiya-
va-intihobot.html. 
72  Reissner, Islam in der Weltgesellschaft (see note 62), 20. 
73  Discussions and interaction with Nahzatis in 2013 and 
2014. 
74  On the typological connection between Islamism, protest 
and da’wa, see Reissner, Islam in der Weltgesellschaft (see note 62), 
20–22. 
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Nahzat’s, and which categorically exclude any co-
operation with the ruling regime (see below). 
By stepping up recruitment among the youth in 
all parts of the country and working with migrant 
communities abroad (especially in Russia), which 
with about 1.5 million (or half the male population of 
working age) represent a significant political force,75 
Nahzat seeks to integrate protest potential and pre-
vent radicalisation. It makes use of modern media, 
especially social networks, as well as mouth-to-mouth 
propaganda and has been able to gain support among 
the Ismailite minority in the Pamir region of Gorno-
Badakhshan, which was not originally Nahzat terri-
tory. But the party owes its growth in membership 
from 20,000 in 2000 to 41,000 in 2014 largely to the 
recruitment of women, who make up 53 percent of 
its membership.76 This confirms a general trend of 
growing female interest in Islam (see above, p. 18). 
This makes Nahzat by far the largest opposition 
party.77 It has participated in parliamentary elections 
since 2000, consistently polling between 7 and 9 per-
cent.78 Its failure to clear the 5 percent hurdle in the 
March 2015 vote, which left it excluded from parlia-
ment, is partly accounted for by the regime’s great 
efforts to discredit it morally and politically during 
the run-up.79 It must also be presumed that irregulari-
ties occurred during the campaign and the count.80 
The chronic repression directed against the party sug-
gests that the government believes Nahzat’s base to be 
considerably broader than the official figures would 
75  Andrea Schmitz and Alexander Wolters, Political Protest 
in Central Asia, SWP Research Paper 7/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2012), 13–14. 
76  Information from party headquarter (May 2014). 
77  Discussion with representatives of political parties in 
Dushanbe (summer 2014). 
78  In the 2010 election the party was credited with 7.74 per-
cent and two seats. Its actual share of the vote was in all prob-
ability larger. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(OSCE/ODIHR), Republic of Tajikistan, Parliamentary Elections 28 
February 2010, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final 
Report (Warsaw, 6 July 2010), 22, 25–28. 
79  The repertoire ranges from smear campaigns and bureau-
cratic obstruction to systematic intimidation and violence 
against individual members. One example: “Tajikistan: Dirty 
Tricks Discredit Opposition Ahead of Parliamentary ‘Vote’”, 
EurasiaNet, 12 February 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
node/72036. 
80  OSCE/ODIHR, International Election Observation Mission, 
Republic of Tajikistan, Parliamentary Elections 1 March 2015, State-
ment of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Dushanbe, 
2 March 2015. 
suggest. As well as consistently seeking to reduce 
Nahzat’s political leeway, the government also sys-
tematically obstructs its offers of cooperation.81 This 
leaves it trapped in its protest role and allows the 
regime of President Rahmon to present itself as the 
guarantor of peace, unity and stability82 against the 
Islamist “troublemakers”. Here the regime can also 
count on the religious elite, which rejects the utili-
sation of Islam by political parties on the grounds that 
religious institutions should be kept free of political 
agitation.83 This position matches the provisions of 
the law on religion, which prohibits political activity 
by representatives of religious organisations on the 
grounds of separation of religion and politics.84 The 
background to the ruling is that Nahzat has always 
enjoyed support among parts of the clergy and in-
dependent religious authorities and in the past has 
often used medressas and mosques to propagate non-
conformist ideas. 
Illegal Groups 
Since independence Islamist groups of various per-
suasions have sought to gain a foothold in Tajikistan. 
At the beginning this meant above all the Islamic Move-
ment of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMU emerged out of the 
reformist currents in Islam that grew during the pere-
strojka era in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley 
and inspired the founding of various Islamist groups 
there following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
They were, however, very quickly banned in Uzbeki-
stan and in 1992 their leaders fled to Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan where they joined the Tajik Islamists 
in the civil war, along with several thousand Uzbek 
fighters. In the course of the peace negotiations 
between the UTO and the Rahmon regime, however, 
the leaders of the Uzbek units parted ways with the 
81  Discussions with Nahzatis in Sughd and Dushanbe (2013/ 
2014). 
82  This semantic field plays an important role in stabilising 
the regime. Tim Epkenhans, “Zwischen Mythos und Minen-
feld: Historiographie in Tadschikistan”, Osteuropa 62, no. 3 
(2012): 137–50. 
83  Discussions in Dushanbe, Sughd and Khatlon (2013 and 
2014) with representatives of the ‘ulamā – who admittedly 
ignore the fact that the regime itself uses the religious asso-
ciations as a political resource. 
84  Qonuni Jumhurii Tojikiston “Dar Borai Ozodii Vijdon Va Ittiho-
diyahoi Dinī” (see note 43), chap. 2, art. 5 (3). 
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UTO and founded the IMU.85 The goal of the move-
ment was to depose President Karimov and establish 
an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. It received support 
from Saudi donors, including Osama bin Laden, and 
from the Taliban in whose medressas and camps 
numerous IMU fighters were trained. At the end of 
the 1990s the IMU repeatedly attempted to penetrate 
Uzbek territory from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but 
the US invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 2001 
forced it to withdraw to Pakistan, where it became 
embroiled in local conflicts. One branch of the IMU, 
the Qaeda-connected Islamic Jihad Union, subsequently 
resumed the struggle in Central Asia, carrying out a 
series of suicide bombings in Uzbekistan in 2004.86 
But the focus of both groups shifted to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, where support from the Taliban sup-
plied considerably better conditions for armed 
struggle than in Central Asia. 
That does not, however, mean that radical Islamists 
entirely lost interest in the region. In summer 2010 the 
IMU claimed responsibility for an ambush on a Tajik 
army unit in the east of the country, whose impassa-
ble mountains had long served as a refuge. Only a few 
weeks later a group named Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh (“Com-
munity of the Helpers of Allah”) claimed responsibility 
for a suicide attack on a police post in the northern 
Tajik town of Khujand.87 Since then there have been 
repeated arrests of supposed members of the group,88 
which says it operates independently of the IMU, pre-
sents itself as a Tajik organisation with an internation-
alist outlook, and claims a leading role in jihadist 
activities within the country. Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh expli-
85  On the history of the IMU: Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise 
of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven et al., 2002), 137–86; 
Martha Brill Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington et 
al.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012),  
253–85; Babadzhanov, “Islam in Uzbekistan” (see note 26), 
314–19. 
86  Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (see note 85), 290–97. 
87  Tilav Rasulzoda and Parvina Khamidova, “New Militant 
Force in Tajikistan?” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 22 
October 2010; “Tadzhikistan: Otvetstvennost’ za šachidskuju 
ataku v Chudžande vzjala na sebja organizacsija ‘Džamaat 
Ansarullach’”, [Tajikistan: Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh claims respon-
sibility for suicide attack in Khujand], Kavkaz Center, 8 Septem-
ber 2010, http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/ 
09/08/75108.shtml. 
88  Most recently: Mvljuda Rafieva, “V Sogde zaderžany 12 
podozrevaemych v členstve ‘Džamoate Ansorulloch’” [12 sus-
pected members of Jamo‘at Ansorulloh detained in Sughd], 
AsiaPlus, 12 November 2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ru/news/v-sogde-
zaderzhany-12-podozrevaemykh-v-chlenstve-v-dzhamoate-
ansorullokh. 
citly rejects the Islam propagated in Tajik state media, 
which it calls a “product of communism”, a perverted 
Islam of “hypocrites” (munofiq) who prevent believers 
from living by the laws of their religion. Those who 
do so, they say, are excluded in the name of tolerance 
and democracy, while the regime inflicts the pseudo-
religion of democracy upon Muslims, even at the price 
of many deaths.89 
The civil war in Syria and the advance of the Islamic 
State has opened up a new arena of jihad in which at 
least 1,500 fighters from Central Asia are involved (with 
some sources citing much larger numbers). According 
to official data, between two and three hundred of 
them are said to come from Tajikistan.90 Most of these 
were recruited not at home but in Russia, working as 
seasonal labourers under generally difficult condi-
tions in an often hostile environment. It is apparently 
more belief in the cause and the prospect of recogni-
tion that makes “holy war” attractive to these men 
(and increasingly also women) than material incen-
tives.91 The internet plays a growing role as a medium 
of recruitment and propaganda. In that context the 
appointment of a Tajik fighter as Islamic State emir in 
the Syrian province of Raqqa, reported in August 
2014,92 was a significant propaganda move. The Tajik 
government has apparently realised that the threat of 
punishment will not stem the successful recruitment 
of Tajiks to the new front of the “holy war” and has 
offered immunity to those who return voluntarily.93 
Prominent religious authorities have also called upon 
89  “Baioniai ‚Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh‘ ba hukumat va kumitai 
amniati millī va nuskhaash ba millati dinparvari sharifi 
Tojikiston” [“Declaration of Jamo‘ati Ansorulloh to the gov-
ernment, the national security committee and to the nation 
of the honoured believers of Tajikistan”], Irshod: Rohnamo ba 
sui islom [Admonition: Guidance to Islam], 27 September 2013, 
http://irshod.com/index.php?newsid=1440. 
90  “Kazakh Pundit Says Large Numbers of Central Asian Mili-
tants Fighting in Syria”, BBC Monitoring Global Newsline, 17 Sep-
tember 2014; Joanna Paraszczuk, “Islamic Center Slams Tajik 
IS Militants Who Want to Wage Jihad at Home”, RFE/RL, 8 
January 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/under-black-flag-
tajik-militants-islamic-center/26783304.html. 
91  “Tajikistan Struggles to Stem Rise of Jihadi Recruits”, 
EurasiaNet, 12 August 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/ 
69511. 
92  “Uroženec Tadžikistana stal emirom ‘Islamskogo chali-
fata’ v provincii Ar-Rakka Sirii” [Tajik becomes emir of Islamic 
Caliphate in Syrian province of Raqqa], AsiaPlus, 26 August 
2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ru/news/urozhenets-tadzhikistana-stal-
emirom-islamskogo-khalifata-v-provintsii-ar-rakka-sirii. 
93  “Tajikistan Struggles to Stem Rise of Jihadi Recruits” 
(see note 91). 
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the jihadists to return with the argument that the war 
in Syria is not in fact jihad: that one could not speak 
of “holy war” where Muslim was fighting against Mus-
lim. Those who were calling for it, they said, had not 
understood Islam.94 But the addresses of those admo-
nitions, as their prompt response demonstrates, are 
not open to scholarly distinctions as these represent 
an Islam they reject.95 It is thus questionable whether 
the interventions of Hanafite authorities lend 
themselves to stopping those who have adopted the 
perspective of the Islamist fundamental opposition. 
This category also includes Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami 
(Islamic Party of Liberation), which was founded in 
1953 in Saudi Arabia and Jordan and began operating 
in Central Asia at the end of the 1990s. The ultimate 
objective of the party, which is banned across Central 
Asia, is to overcome the secular nation-state and other 
Western models and to unite the Central Asian repub-
lics under a caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects the use 
of violence to achieve this end, preferring instead sys-
tematic persuasion employing both traditional and 
modern technologies.96 In common with all clandes-
tine groups, there are only very rough estimates of its 
size, some of them based on dubious sources.97 What 
can be said with certainty is that it achieved great 
early successes above all in Uzbekistan and in the Tajik 
and Kyrgyz parts of the Ferghana Valley. In Tajikistan 
disappointment with Nahzat and its cooperation with 
the regime is likely to have played a role. The attrac-
tion of the universalist orientation of Hizb ut-Tahrir, 
with its explicit ideology of a caliphate utopia, over 
94  One example: “Chodži Mirzo: Rossija stala logovom po 
rekrutu tadžikskoj molodeži v Siriju” [Hoji Mirzo: Russia 
has become recruiting ground for Tajik youth for Syria], 
Radio Ozodi, 14 May 2014, http://rus.ozodi.org/content/article/ 
25384552.html; Mirzoi Salimpur, “Domullo Hikmatulloh: 
Vaqte fitna khest, ba dast shamsheri chubin bigir!” [Domullo 
Hikmatulloh: If sedition arises, take a sword of wood!], Radio 
Ozodi, 11 January 2015, http://www.ozodi.org/content/fmous-
tajik-cleric-doullah-hikmatullah-rejected-jihad-in-syria/ 
26787278.html. 
95  “Otvet tadžikiskich ‘džichadistov v Sirii’ predstavitelju 
duchovenstva” [Response of Tajik “jihadists in Syria” to a 
representative of the clergy], Radio Ozodi, 27 May 2014, http:// 
rus.ozodi.org/content/article/25399751.html. 
96  Rashid, Jihad (see note 85), 115–24. 
97  In 2003 the International Crisis Group put the number 
of members across Central Europe at about 20,000: Interna-
tional Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to 
Hizb ut-Tahrir, Asia Report 58 (Osh and Brussels, 2003), 17. 
the nation-oriented and ideologically less consistent 
Nahzat, has, however, been overestimated.98 
Hizb ut-Tahrir also faces competition from other 
revivalist movements that regard themselves as un-
political. One of the largest globally operating Islamist 
movements is Jamo‘ati Tabligh (Society for Spreading 
Faith), whose roots lie in the Indian subcontinent. It 
has been present in Central Asia since the second half 
of the 1990s, being most popular in Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan. Many of the Central Asian 
Tablighi became acquainted with the movement while 
studying in Pakistan. The movement seeks spiritual 
renewal through the call to Islam (da‘wa) by word of 
mouth, and regards itself as strictly apolitical. It was 
nonetheless banned in Tajikistan in 2006, partly 
because of its successful and largely uncontrollable 
missionary work, and partly because of fears that 
radical groups could also disseminate their teachings 
under the cover of its work.99 
The situation is similar with the Salafiya, which has 
grown in popularity since 2005 and like the Tablighi 
originated with returning foreign students.100 As else-
where, actors today designated as “Salafists” in Tajiki-
stan orientate on the “pious predecessors” of early 
Islam (as-salaf as-salih), reject any differentiation between 
Islamic legal schools, and therefore distance them-
selves vehemently from Hanafite normative doctrines 
and liturgical rules (such as personal supplication 
[du‘a] after formal prayers), which they reject as heresy 
(bid‘a). They differ from the reformist Islamism of Nah-
zat through their abstinence from politics.101 The 
Salafiya was added to the list of banned organisations 
in January 2009,102 but lives on as an informal net-
98  See for example Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in 
Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Central Asian Studies 
Series (London and New York, 2010), 96–101; similar Kathleen 
N. Collins, “Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evi-
dence from Central Asia and the Caucasus”, World Politics 60 
(October 2007), 64–96 (75–89). Karagiannis (Political Islam in 
Central Asia, ibid., 72) puts the number of members in Tajiki-
stan at about three thousand. 
99  Nargiz Hamrabaeva, “Tajik Clampdown on Islamic Group 
Could Backfire”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 9 October 
2009. On the Tablighis in Kyrgyzstan see Aksana Ismailbekova 
and Emil Nasritdinov, “Transnational Social Networks in Cen-
tral Asia: Structure, Travel, and Culture of Kyrgyz Tablighi 
Jama‘at”, Transnational Social Review 2, no. 2 (2012): 177–95. 
100  Abramson, Foreign Religious Education (see note 55), 41f. 
101  Discussions with imams and young people in Sughd 
(2013/2014). 
102  Farangis Najibullah, “Salafi Ban Reflects Tajik Officials’ 
Growing Fear”, RFE/RL, 9 January 2009, http://www.rferl.org/ 
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work whose purist interpretations of Islam are very 
prevalent in the religious discourse. The Salafiya’s clas-
sification as an “extremist organisation” in January 
2015 (joining IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Tablighi),103 
is unlikely to change that in the medium term. 
 
 
content/Salafi_Ban_Reflects_Tajik_Officials_Growing_Fear/ 
1368347.html. 
103  Achliddin Salimov, “Tečenie ‘Salafija’ priznano v Tadžiki-
stane ekstremistskoj gruppirovkoj” [Salafiya movement in 
Tajikistan classed as “extremist group”], AsiaPlus, 12 January 
2015, http://asiaplus.tj/ru/news/techenie-salafiya-priznano-v-
tadzhikistane-ekstremistskoi-gruppirovkoi. 
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The actors outlined in the previous section do not 
form closed discursive communities. Instead they 
represent different discursive milieus with flowing 
transitions, on a spectrum between two opposing 
intellectual traditions. At one end is an Islam an-
chored in the Hanafite tradition, which derives its 
normative standards from the principles of Hanafite 
jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh). These are based on the 
divine revelation (the Koran), the body of recognised 
sayings and actions of the Prophet (the Sunnah) and 
the consensus (ijmā‘) of the scholars on the interpreta-
tion of these sources. This approach distinguishes 
sharply between legal and ethical norms and accepts 
the ensuing tension between worldly legal rationality 
and individual religious practice.104 Epistemological 
scepticism and tolerance towards normative pluralism 
characterise this intellectual tradition, which devel-
oped a tendency for ritual purism during the Soviet 
era (see above, p. 9). It is represented by the clergy, as 
well as most of the older generation of independent 
religious authorities. 
The Islam of the Hanafite religious elite shares its 
ritual purism with the second strand of discourse, 
which emerges out of reformist and revivalist tradi-
tions, but has taken the rejection of culture-specific 
variants of Muslim religiosity to extremes. This cur-
rent of thought is decidedly anti-clerical and anti-
intellectual, attacking all the legal schools and their 
educational principles or declaring them irrelevant, 
and rejecting the separation of law, religion and 
ethics. Any recourse to the authoritative scholars of a 
tradition (taqlid) is rejected as blind imitation. Instead 
it upholds the principle of independent reasoning 
(ijtihād) based on the primary sources (Koran and the 
sayings and actions of the Prophet [hadith]). To the 
reformists, their interpretation, which in traditional 
jurisprudence presupposes scholarly education, re-
quires no special training. Instead the message of 
divine revelation appears directly and unquestionably 
out of the primary scriptures, and is therefore uni-
 
104  On usūl al-fiqh: Baber Johansen, “Introduction: The Muslim 
Fiqh as a Sacred Law”, in idem, Contingency in a Sacred Law 
(Leiden et al., 1999), 1–76. 
versal and unrelativisable.105 This current, which 
bypasses historical traditions, is attractive to all those 
who seek change. It contains a broad spectrum rang-
ing from jihadist Salafism at one end to the domesti-
cated Islamism of Nahzat at the other. The latter 
represents a hybrid form to the extent that the party 
explicitly acknowledges Hanafite Islam as part of the 
national cultural tradition and distances itself from 
the universalism of the Salafist movements. 
These two intellectual poles, the Hanafite tradition-
alism and the reformist impetus of the Salafist school 
of thought, mark the bounds of the discursive field on 
which the dispute over the relationship between reli-
gious and state authority, secular norms and religious 
ethics, evolves. So what are the critical topoi that reveal 
the lines of conflict? What positions can be differenti-
ated? And what roles do the interventions of state reli-
gion policy play in the symbolic struggles? 
Themes and Positions 
The controversy ignites over two sets of issues. The 
first relates to the question of who can claim the legiti-
mate right to speak in the name of Islam, and how 
much state intervention is permissible there. The sec-
ond concerns practical problems in implementing the 
word of Allah. 
The latter include, for example, a ban on the partic-
ipation of minors in communal prayer in mosques 
introduced in 2011.106 This provokes anger because the 
practice is widely held to comply with the Sunnah and 
is firmly rooted in religious custom. The ban is there-
fore often ignored, which can lead to awkward ques-
tions or even charges. Similarly contested – and much 
more consequential – is the question of the hijab (the 
female head veil that leaves only the face exposed) 
at state schools and universities. Under an education 
ministry decree from 2005 the garment is not per-
mitted. The state justifies the ban on the grounds that 
 
105  On the relationship between taqlid and ijtihād: Devin 
DeWeese, “Authority”, in Key Themes for the Study of Islam, ed. 
Jamal J. Elias (Oxford, 2010), 26–52. 
106  Zakon RT “Ob otvetstvennosti roditelej za obučenie i vospitanie 
detej” (see note 60), chap. 2 (8). 
Themes and Positions 
this form of veil is not part of the national cultural 
tradition, just like mini-skirts and other revealing 
garments that are not tolerated either. 
For those who follow the rules of the Koran, the 
ban unequivocally contravenes the religious command-
ment for women to cover themselves in the presence 
of men who do not clearly fall into the category of 
mahram (the closest blood relations, those excluded 
from marriage).107 In fact the rule is accepted by all 
religious actors, including the ‘ulamā, who however 
refrain from criticising the state ban and instead tol-
erate this and other imperfections of worldly govern-
ance as long as the freedom to practice religion is 
largely preserved.108 But for many this is not enough. 
Representatives of Nahzat, independent religious 
authorities, as well as Western NGOs,109 criticise the 
hijab ban in schools, universities and state (as well as 
many private) institutions as a violation of the funda-
mental rights of women that stigmatises all those who 
wish to follow the rules of sharia. Behind this, they 
say, lies the state’s intention to suppress the influence 
of religion.110 
This assessment is widely shared by believers, and 
for many it produces a dilemma. Faced with the choice 
of following the secular law or the religious command-
ment some parents deny their daughters a university 
education, and not a few women will turn down a job 
where they are not permitted to wear the hijab. The 
fact that it is often husbands who force their wives to 
make this choice changes nothing in the outcome: 
disjoint between the secular principles of state policy 
and the religious needs of a growing segment of the 
population worsens the trend of increasing numbers 
of women either not working or enjoying access only 
to poorly paid work. This is all the more problematic 
where the absence of husbands working abroad leaves 
many women in need of additional income to feed 
their families. 
The conflict between secular and religious norms 
manifests itself not least in the status and function 
of the religious personnel of the mosques (imams and 
107  Mostly citing Surat an-Nūr 24: 31. 
108  Discussions with representatives of the ‘ulamā in Sughd, 
Khatlon and Dushanbe (2013/2014). 
109  For example United States Department of State, 2013 
Report on International Religious Freedom – Tajikistan, 28 July 
2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/53d907078.html. 
110  One example: “Ch. A. Turajonzoda: ‘Religioznyj vakuum 
zapolnilsja fanatizmon’” [Fanaticism fills religious vacuum], 
Radio Ozodi, 7 October 2013, http://rus.ozodi.org/content/ 
turajonzoda_tajikistan_interview_/24097223.html. 
khatibs) and of the ‘ulamā. Their position entitles 
them to comment – in the form of sermons and (in 
the case of the Council of the ‘Ulamā) fatwas – on 
questions of rite and dogma and to show believers the 
righteous path to paradise. Just as important as the 
inner attitude of the believer is how this is manifested 
in everyday life. The Islamic ethic is – like that of all 
religions of redemption – principally a social ethics 
that, as a “systematised and rationalised totality of 
explicit norms”,111 also touches on the relationship to 
worldly power. The religious personnel, therefore, en-
joys sweeping power of interpretation and on account 
of their prominent status reach a large audience. This 
places the clergy, at least potentially, in a relationship 
of competition to politics, which for its part seeks to 
restrict their power. 
The most important instruments for controlling 
religious personnel and ensuring their loyalty are 
outlined above (p. 16). The introduction of knowledge 
tests, where representatives of the ‘ulamā and the 
Committee for Religious Affairs regularly check the 
qualifications of the imams, was especially controver-
sial, including among the clergy themselves. The then 
qāzi kalon (“chief judge”), Akbar Turajonzoda, had 
attempted unsuccessfully to introduce such a test at 
the beginning of the 1990s.112 Today too, representa-
tives of the senior clergy tend to support the measure, 
which they regard as a sensible and – in view of the 
often inadequate formal knowledge of the imams of 
the village mosques – also necessary means of quality 
control, and one that lends itself to guarding the 
specific dogma and liturgy of Hanafite Islam from the 
influence of other (especially Salafist) currents.113 
Others regard the test as a violation of their dignity, 
and even secular critics of Emomali Rahmon were 
indignant about the state interference.114 
Critics of the state religion policy perceive the dis-
semination of approved texts for Friday sermons by 
the Committee for Religious Affairs as a particularly 
odious example of the disempowerment of religious 
authority. In fact the texts almost always concern 
questions of religious ethics, about which there is 
broad consensus,115 and the imams themselves regard 
111  Pierre Bourdieu, “Genese und Struktur des religiösen 
Feldes”, in idem, Religion, Schriften zur Kultursoziologie, 
vol. 5, ed. Franz Schultheis and Stephan Egger (Frankfurt 
am Main, 2011), 30–90 (54). 
112  Mullojonov, “The Islamic Clergy” (see note 32), 234. 
113  Discussions with imams (2013/2014). 
114  Najibullah, “Tajikistan” (see note 49). 
115  Examples in the author’s possession. 
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them as “recommendations” that leave plenty of room 
for interpretation.116 But occasionally they also contain 
affirmative comments on state policies (for example 
references to speeches by the president). While this 
offers ammunition to the critics, the imams are gen-
erally not inclined to dramatise the matter, as they 
regard the state’s policies as essentially compatible 
with Hanafite doctrine and not obstructive to the prac-
tice of belief. 
The outlined examples point not only to the tensions 
between state and religious authority, but also to the 
principles of legitimisation of the latter, which rest 
upon two different roots: proof of formal competence 
(which implies internal hierarchies) and charismatic 
qualification (legitimised by a following). Most believ-
ers have only basic religious education, but they ex-
pect more from an imam than knowledge of Koran 
and Sunnah. Force of conviction, approachability and 
personal integrity are decisive for the reputation of an 
imam. Believers are generally well aware of the state 
oversight of the imams and the curtailment of the 
autonomy of religious associations, but most accept 
these as a necessary evil that does no harm to a 
respected imam or his mosque. 
But among growing numbers of believers, especial-
ly the younger generation, anger at state intervention 
in religious questions is growing – and with it also 
dissatisfaction with official religious authorities and 
their willingness to cooperate with the regime. 
In particular the growing numbers who possess their 
own formal religious education or draw religious 
knowledge from publicly accessible sources such as 
the internet hold a low opinion of official religious 
authorities. They accuse the khatibs of preaching only 
a state-approved Islam, instead of criticising violations 
of religious commandments by a regime that pre-
scribes the separation of state and religion but itself 
contravenes that rule. 
Here the mindset of relativisation, compromise and 
pragmatism that is so characteristic of the religious 
elite encounters a habitus of zeal and religious fervour 
that sociology of religion describes as heresy and soci-
ology of communication as protest.117 It is thus unsur-
prising if Nahzat and other Islamist groups treat the 
‘ulamā as the centrepiece of state interventions in the 
116  Use is certainly made of this leeway (participant obser-
vation in Sughd, 2013/2014). 
117  Bourdieu, “Genese und Struktur” (see note 111); Niklas 
Luhmann, “Protestbewegungen”, in idem, Protest: Systemtheorie 
und soziale Bewegungen, ed. Kai-Uwe Hellmann (Frankfurt am 
Main, 1996), 201–15. 
sphere of religion and question their credibility.118 
But unlike the radical Islamist opposition, Nahzat also 
seeks dialogue with the ‘ulamā.119 Nahzat’s communi-
cation with its religious opponent – like with its politi-
cal adversary – oscillates between criticism and coopera-
tion. But the political and religious authorities have 
different reasons for their rejection. For the regime the 
party is a disagreeable rival. And to some extent this 
perception also underlies the stance of the ‘ulamā, 
whose existence depends on the patronage of the 
political rulers. But the diverging interpretations of 
the ‘ulamā and their critics over the relationship 
between state and religion and their respective spheres 
of influence are at least as significant. 
The debate over a fatwa issued by the Council of 
the ‘Ulamā in September 2014 provides an illuminat-
ing example. There were two aspects to this widely 
discussed and highly controversial fatwa. On the one 
hand it was directed against “agitation” and “propa-
ganda” aiming to destabilise society and condemned 
any cooperation with mass media, organisations or 
political parties at home or abroad whose actions were 
directed towards that goal as a “grave sin”. The same 
verdict was issued against any Muslim participating 
in wars against Muslims in other countries or joining 
terrorist organisations.120 While obviously directed 
against all those who joined the fighting in Syria and 
Iraq or were thinking of doing so, the fatwa remained 
vague with respect to the agents of destabilisation. 
This part of the fatwa, namely, was attacked by the 
critics, and provoked very forthright interpretations: 
The Council of the ‘Ulamā, they said, was openly serv-
ing the regime, which wished to curtail the constitu-
tional right of freedom of expression. The fatwa, it was 
said, represented a political intervention where the 
‘ulamā had overstepped its powers and violated the 
secular principle. Fatwas should relate only to ques-
tions of sharia, it was said, and instead of speaking out 
118  Two examples: “Imom-khatibi mardumī, na attestatsionī: 
Muloqoti Raisi HNIT M. Kabirī bo javonon” [Popular imam-
khatib, not certified: Meeting of IRPT chair M. Kabiri with 
youth], Nahzat.tj, 15 October 2014, http://nahzat.tj/13159-
emomhatibi-mardum-na-attestatsion.html; “Otvet tadžikis-
kich ‘džichadistov’” (see note 95). 
119  One example: “Kabirī guft, omodaast bo Abdulqodirzoda 
rubaru suhbat kunad” [Kabiri says he is willing to meet with 
(mufti) Abdulkodirzoda], Ozodagon, 16 May 2014, http://www. 
ozodagon.com/16193-kabir-guft-omodaast-bo-abdulodirzoda-
rbar-sbat-kunad.html. 
120  “Mufti na straže mira” [Mufti as guardian of peace], 
AsiaPlus, 8 October 2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ru/news/muftii-na-
strazhe-mira. 
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against freedom of expression and pluralism the 
Council would do better to criticise corruption and 
unemployment. The Council of the ‘Ulamā rejected 
the criticism, arguing that it was not only its right but 
its duty to remind citizens to guard peace and stability. 
These, it said, represented the precondition for citi-
zens to be able to exercise their religious and civil 
rights at all.121 
This line of argumentation fits perfectly with the 
Hanafite school of law, which draws a clear distinction 
between state and religion, but regards the unity and 
stability of the state as a necessary condition for the 
protection of rights and religion. While religion can 
exist without the protection of the state, the latter is 
necessary if religion is to be maintained as a social 
system and way of life.122 This functional interpreta-
tion of the relationship between law, religion and the 
state corresponds to the status of the scholars, whose 
task is to “ensure the unity of profane and sacral, of 
state order, social practice and individual religious 
life” and work for an appropriate relationship with 
both state and society.123 
The debate over the fatwa makes it clear that opin-
ions about what can be regarded as appropriate in 
this relationship diverge sharply and that the binding 
authority of the scholars to regulate that relationship 
is challenged by parts of society. The critical moment 
is plainly the relationship between the ‘ulamā and a 
state that intervenes strongly in the sphere of the reli-
gious in the name of secularism. 
Religion Policy Interventions 
The Tajik constitution guarantees both the secular 
order and the right to freedom of religion. But the 
latter is not one of the “immutable principles” of the 
constitution while the former is. The constitution 
places a higher premium on the secular principle 
than on freedom of religion, by prohibiting religious 
121  One example: Mechrangez Tursunzoda, “Muftijat: so-
trudničestvo so SMI – ‘destabilizatorami’ – ‘velikij grech’” 
[Muftiat: Cooperation with “destabilising” mass media is a 
“grave sin”], AsiaPlus, 27 September 2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ 
ru/news/muftiyat-sotrudnichestvo-so-smi-destabilizatorami-
velikii-grekh. 
122  Baber Johansen, “Staat, Recht und Religion im Sun-
nitischen Islam: Können Muslime einen religionsneutralen 
Staat akzeptieren?” in idem, Contingency in a Sacred Law (see 
note 104), 263–348 (278–83). 
123  Ibid., 276. 
associations from interfering in matters of state – but 
not state interference in matters of religion.124 The state 
does indeed intervene massively in the freedom of 
religion, through specific laws,125 whose implementa-
tion is controlled and overseen by a state agency, the 
Committee for Religious Affairs. 
In the course of various rearrangements of the state 
executive apparatus, the Committee for Religious 
Affairs became attached to the presidential adminis-
tration in 2010, underlining its prominent status. It 
possesses extensive executive, representative and legis-
lative powers that are laid down in a government 
decree of May 2010:126 As well as advising the govern-
ment on questions of policy, the Committee also puts 
forward draft laws and proposals for legal amend-
ments and oversees their implementation in collabo-
ration with local security organs. The Committee for 
Religious Affairs coordinates the relationship between 
state organs and religious associations and is respon-
sible for the administrative control of mosques, whose 
khatibs are answerable to it. The Committee functions 
as a censor in approving religious literature for legal 
dissemination. It coordinates the foreign contacts of 
religious associations and presents state religion policy 
at conferences at home and abroad as well as through 
its own publications. It also organises the annual pil-
grimage to Mecca, defining a specific contingent of 
pilgrims each year, calculating the cost and the num-
ber of accompanying staff needed, and administers 
the travel contributions raised from the pilgrims. 
This makes the Committee for Religious Affairs a 
kind of super-agency that unites political and admin-
istrative functions, possesses sweeping powers to take 
decisions and issue instructions, and even controls the 
implementation of its own measures. Its configuration 
reveals the paternalistic desire of the state to channel 
and steer the religious needs of the population and 
thus ensure stability in the field of religion.127 Meas-
124  Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Tajikistan, chap. 1, 
art. 1 and 8, http://www.president.tj/en/taxonomy/term/5/28. 
125  Such as the laws “On the freedom of belief and religious 
association” (see note 43) and “On the responsibility of par-
ents for the education of their children” (see note 60). 
126  Pravitel’stvo Respubliki Tadžikistan, Postanovlenie o Komi-
tete po delam religii pri Pravitel’stve Tadžikistan [Government of 
the Republic of Tajikistan, decree on the Committee for Reli-
gious Affairs under the government of the Republic], Is-
lamNews.tj (heading Komitet po delam religii), undated. 
127  “Ne stoit sozdavat’ stereotipy čto v Tadžikistane vse 
zapreščeno: Interv’ju predsedatelja komiteta po delam religii 
pri pravitel’stve RT Abdurachima Cholikova” [Stereotype that 
everything is banned in Tajikistan is unfounded: Interview 
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ures pushed through since 2010 reveal two thrusts: 
Firstly the forming of a quietist unitary Islam by 
activating those elements of the Hanafite tradition 
that are compatible with the demands of the secular 
state and have already proven their usefulness in 
the secularised order of the Soviet era. The most im-
portant measure for keeping control are exerting 
intense influence on appointments to religious 
institutions, standardisation of job profiles for reli-
gious personnel, and standardising the curricula for 
the religious education institutions, whose number 
has been gradually reduced in the course of the past 
decade.128 Conversely, religious authorities who 
criticise the state religion policy or disseminate views 
that deviate from the accepted norm (for example on 
the hijab question) are branded as troublemakers.129 
Secondly, the pressure to conform generated by the 
comprehensive enforcement of rules and regulations 
is amplified by the establishment of structures akin to 
those of an official church. The top of the hierarchy is 
the state Committee for Religious Affairs, flanked by 
the Islamic Centre and the Council of the ‘Ulamā. The 
latter has the status of a consultative organ, but no 
authority to issue directives (see above, p. 16). The reli-
gious associations – the mosques that shape the imme-
diate contact to the believers – are answerable to the 
Committee for Religious Affairs. The khatibs of the 
Friday mosques now receive a monthly salary from 
the state, which consolidates the vertical hierarchy 
and directly reveals the underlying relationship. 
In the coordination of religion policy and the over-
sight of the religious associations the Committee for 
Religious Affairs works closely together with the state 
security organs. This is justified in terms of the need 
to ensure religious stability and protect religion from 
abuse by actors pursuing “extremist”, “terrorist” 
or “self-serving” objectives.130 And indeed such mis-
creants are regularly detected, and the mass media, 
especially state-run television, regularly report on 
with the chair of the Committee for Religious Affairs of the 
government of the Republic of Tajikistan, Abdurahim Kholi-
kov], IslamNews.tj, 11 July 2011, http://islamnews.tj/interview/ 
20-ne-stoit-sozdavat-stereotipy-chto-v-tadzhikistane-vse-
zaprescheno.html. 
128  While there were still nineteen registered medressas 
in 2004, the number had fallen to six by summer 2014. 
129  One example: Avaz Juldašev, “Brat’ja Turadžonzoda 
prizyvajut vlasti prekratit’ ‘iskat’ vragov’” [Turajonzoda 
brothers call on regime to call off “hunt for enemies”], 
Asia Plus, 7 May 2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ru/node/187945. 
130  One example: “Ne stoit sozdavat’ stereotipy” (see 
note 127). 
security operations. Measured by the number of arrests, 
religiously motivated terrorism in Tajikistan is a mar-
ginal phenomenon. But in the media discourse the 
threat scenario is very present. Evoking danger sup-
posedly presented by terrorist groups keeps society in 
a permanent state of alert and makes the surveillance 
of religious institutions a question of national security 
and stability. 
This development is also promoted by the policies 
of foreign states. Russia, China, and the West too, all 
perceive Central Asia above all as a potential hotbed of 
instability and religious extremism and respond with 
measures designed to reinforce the existing state in-
stitutions. This particular focus has led to extremely 
questionable partnerships, thanks not least to pro-
found (but for reasons of political correctness un-
spoken) reservations against Muslim values, which 
both the post-communist elites and large parts of 
the Western public associate with backwardness and 
hostility to progress. The tacit agreement that an 
Islamisation of Central Asian societies is undesirable 
turns these “partners” into veritable accomplices. 
The argumentative linkage of Islam and security 
that is firmly established in the public discourse and 
the political practice it legitimises have far-reaching 
consequences. Firstly, this stabilises a distinction that 
already characterised the Islam discourse of the Soviet 
epoch, namely, the dichotomy between a (basically 
unproblematic) private everyday Islam and a (problem-
atic, basically “dangerous”) political Islam. Secondly, 
the discursive coupling of religion and stability has 
proven an effective weapon for placing any religiously 
motivated political initiative under suspicion of ex-
tremism. This is clearly demonstrated by attacks not 
only on Nahzat, but also on popular independent 
authorities who resist the domesticisation of religion 
by the state. This leads, thirdly, to religious deviations 
from the norm of whatever kind being driven into 
the private sphere, which thus becomes the symbolic 
place of “true” Islam, just like the hujra of the Soviet 
era. This does not make the religious field any more 
transparent, but, on the contrary, ever more confus-
ing, leading to ever increasing regulation and sur-
veillance. 
This fixation and the instrumentalisation of 
the ‘ulamā for enforcement of state measures have, 
fourthly, led to religious institutions becoming 
perceived as executive organs of state policy and 
weakening their legitimacy as conveyors of faith – 
above all among the young, for whom authenticity 
and credibility are the yardsticks of religious truth, 
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even more than education and knowledge. That is 
especially problematic where the ‘ulamā stands for an 
educational tradition that cultivates nuanced distinc-
tions and is thus in principle ideally equipped to keep 
alive a religious tradition adapted to a secularised state 
and society. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations: 
The Power of the Believers and the Powerlessness of Politics 
 
The end of the Soviet era was accompanied by a grow-
ing interest in Islam. Everyday Muslim practices and 
morals had survived the atheist state ideology but re-
treated into the private sphere. Religious knowledge, 
education and teaching had been largely organised by 
the Spiritual Administration (SADUM), an institution 
of the state bureaucracy that collaborated closely with 
the Soviet power apparatus. SADUM’s authority was 
increasingly challenged by religious actors who criti-
cised the quietism of the “state mullahs” and their 
cooperation with the atheistic regime and demanded 
a stronger application of Islamic ideas and principles 
by returning to the religious primary scriptures, whose 
dissemination was officially prohibited. 
Independence was followed by a power struggle 
between the post-communist regime and a coalition 
of anti-communist groups fighting for a revival of 
national cultural traditions and Islamic governance. 
The post-communist forces won the power struggle, 
but demand for religious education and instruction 
remained strong. The return to Islam as a source of 
moral and practical orientation has been assisted by 
the liberalisation and transnationalisation of the edu-
cation and media landscape. The unhindered dissemi-
nation of religious literature in the country itself and 
the possibility to acquire religious education abroad 
have had a profound impact on the forms and institu-
tions of communication of knowledge. 
Alongside the organised religious authorities of 
the ‘ulamā (Council of the ‘Ulamā and the religious 
personnel of the mosques and medressas) there now 
appeared a growing number of independent teachers, 
many of them self-taught, striving to convey the nor-
mative foundations of Islam to believers. The knowl-
edge of these authorities derives from different edu-
cational currents, including traditional Hanafite Islam 
with its tolerance towards culture-specific rituals and 
secular lifeworlds, but also diverse variants of reformist 
and universalist teachings that already found their 
way into the religious discourse during the Soviet era 
and inspired the emergence of Islamist groups with 
different programmes and objectives. The easy avail-
ability of the primary sources and a broad supply of 
comprehensible interpretations of these newer read-
ings of Islam also fostered their dissemination. In 
rejecting the monopoly of the traditional Islamic edu-
cational elites in favour of individual interpretation of 
the texts, and thereby tending towards a literal inter-
pretation, the reformist approaches satisfy an obvious 
and pronounced desire among lay believers not only 
for clear guidance,131 but also for a democratisation of 
knowledge.132 
The consequence of this development is growing 
polyphony in the landscape of actors and discourses, 
which the regime seeks to contain by tightening over-
sight of religious institutions and creating structures 
that bring them ever more closely in line with the 
state. In this way the religious personnel is integrated 
into the surveillance of the religious field. The declared 
goal is to prevent propaganda by actors that oppose 
the secular order and seek an Islamic state (like Hizb 
ut-Tahrir and various jihadist groups). This is sup-
posedly to ensure security and stability and preserve 
the ethical and liturgical integrity of Tajik Islam. In 
practice, however, stigmatisation extends even to 
Islamist groups and charismatic authorities that ex-
hibit no such tendencies, but operate outside of the 
state-controlled religious institutions (like Nahzat) and 
openly resist political cooptation efforts (like the Tura-
jonzoda brothers and other independent authorities). 
State religion policy is plainly guided by a conviction 
that this strategy renders the religious field more 
orderly and thus more controllable. 
The strategy suffers two grave deficits. Firstly, it 
fails to recognise that unwanted discourses cannot be 
made to go away by suppressing prominent protago-
nists. The new universalist teachings have, conveyed 
both in person and via social networks, long since 
entered mainstream society. The reason these teach-
ings are so popular is that they operate using simple 
distinctions and thus meet the needs of a largely poor-
ly educated body of believers. Intellectualist move-
ments like Hizb ut-Tahrir or the revolutionary utopias 
131  This need is reflected not only in the Friday sermons, 
which sometimes go into very concrete detail on practical 
matters, but also in the problems brought to the domullo, 
whether in person or via the internet.  
132  Demonstrated not least by the growing proportion of 
women engaging in the religious field, for example founding 
discussion groups or joining reading circles. 
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of jihadist attract only a minority. The majority of 
believers are seeking orientation in a world that has 
become confusing and clear answers to the question 
of how to live in concordance with the word of God. 
Secondly, state interventions in the field of religion 
undermine the authority of the state-approved Hana-
fite Islam, which in fact offers convincing answers to 
the questions of interest to believers. This is witnessed 
by the respect enjoyed by many imams and preachers 
at the state-controlled mosques. They fulfil their roles 
very individually and some enjoy great respect even 
among those who perceive the mosques as places of 
“state-controlled” Islam. The overwhelming majority 
of believers supports the secular state, but expects it 
to protect the freedom of religion. The youth in par-
ticular exhibit a pronounced sensitivity for the power 
functions of religious institutions and their instru-
mentalisation by the state apparatus. The effect of 
state harassment is to put religious personnel on the 
defensive, specifically in relation to this group. The 
pressure of legitimisation that bears down on the 
official religious authorities forces them to resort sim-
plifications and refrain from complex argumentations, 
as these might be perceived as dilutions of religious 
prescriptions. 
Local experts are also critical of the state religion 
policy. Instead of, for example, banning children from 
participating in prayers and supplying arguments to 
all those who perceive the state as the enemy of reli-
gion, they recommend improving conditions for good 
religious education, for instance by expanding the 
teaching offered in the mosques.133 The state would 
indeed be well-advised to follow this recommendation. 
For the demand for religious education cannot be 
suppressed by reducing the supply. All that accom-
plishes is to lead those seeking religious instruction 
for themselves and their children to resort to other 
sources, whose quality is just as hard to assess as the 
implicit messages they transport. The exclusion of 
teachers operating outside the state institutions is 
likewise counterproductive, as it exacerbates the 
polarising tendencies in the field of religion. 
This needs to be counteracted by looking to earnest 
integration measures that accept the growing diver-
sity of actors in the field of religion rather than fight-
ing them. But this would presuppose a fundamental 
133  One example: “S čem vernutsja v CA ‘gastarbaitery dži-
chada’?” [What do the “guest workers of jihad” bring back to 
Central Asia?], Asia Plus, 19 September 2014, http://asiaplus.tj/ 
ru/news/s-chem-vernutsya-v-tsa-gastarbaitery-dzhikhada. 
change of course in state religion policy based on a 
recognition of the indispensable role that Hanafite 
Islam plays for integration of society and acknowledg-
ing this by transferring responsibility to the religious 
institutions. This implies firstly enhancing and ex-
panding (optional) religious education at mosques, 
state schools and universities and would need to, sec-
ondly, include targeted investment in the training of 
teaching staff under the supervision of experienced 
scholars and imams. The signs for such a change of 
course are however, currently not auspicious. Religion 
teaching at state schools has been progressively reduced 
in recent years and the number of medressas cut. In 
itself, it is a sensible step to standardise their curricula 
and include secular disciplines, but this will do noth-
ing to reduce the demand for religious teaching. 
The possibilities for Germany and Europe to per-
suade the Tajik government to rethink its strategy and 
encourage a change of course are in this context ex-
tremly limited. Attempts made in the past have come 
to nothing. Back in 2001 the German foreign ministry 
initiated a dialogue between secular and Muslim forces 
conceived as a confidence-building measure, which 
was later continued by the Swiss. The programme was 
revived in 2011 by Germany and France with partici-
pation by the EU representation in Dushanbe, now 
focussing on Islam teaching in state schools. On the 
Tajik side representatives of the education ministry, 
the Committee for Religious Affairs, the Islamic Centre 
and Nahzat were involved. Although the project 
was accepted only very cautiously by the Tajiks, ways 
should be sought to continue it meaningfully and to 
win the government over to a constructive approach 
towards religious education. The present strategy 
of suppression, however, risks further eroding what 
is probably the country’s most important cultural 
resource. 
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